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THE DECLINE OF THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
DANIEL FRANCISt
ABSTRACT

A profound transformation has been worked in the law of the
dormant Commerce Clause. Much contemporary scholarship and many
modem decisions of the Supreme Court present the essential structure
and content of the doctrine in the form that it held through the middle
decades of the 20th century (hereafter the "Traditional Framework"). But
in truth the Court has dramatically eroded the dormant Commerce Clause
since the mid-1980s, leaving it today a slender remnant of the traditional
model. This Article tracks three dimensions of the doctrine's precipitous
decline. First, the Court has profoundly eroded the rule against discriminatory regulation, focusing almost exclusively on "intentional" protectionism. Second, the Court has virtually retired the practice of burden
review, in which the balance between the commercial burden of a state
measure and its social benefits is judicially scrutinized for reasonableness. Third, the Court has created and expanded exceptions to the reach
of the doctrine with remarkable speed. The first and second of these dimensions accord closely with prescriptions offered by Donald Regan in a
seminal 1986 article, but the third dimension marks a decisive step beyond even Regan's prophetic vision. Today, the path ahead remains unclear. Justice Scalia was a powerful and influential critic of the dormant
Commerce Clause, and much may turn on whether his successor continues his project of opposition to the doctrine. But whatever happens next,
the Traditional Framework is now hopelessly out of date, and the
dormant Commerce Clause is in remarkable decline.
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I. INTRODUCTION

[T]he construction of [the Commerce Clause] has been so fully discussed at the bar, and in the opinions delivered by the court in former
cases, that scarcely any thing can be suggested at this day calculated
to throw much additional light upon the subject, or any argument offered which has not heretofore been considered, and commented on,
and which may not be found in the reports of the decisions of this
court.'
1.

Thurlow v. Massachusetts (The License Cases), 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 573 (1847).
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Chief Justice Roger B. Taney
A profound transformation has been worked in the law of the
dormant Commerce Clause. While courts and scholars still invoke a
basic doctrinal model settled in the middle of the last century-a model
that I will call the "Traditional Framework"-this model is now hopelessly out of date. Since the mid-1980s, it has crumbled under a barrage
of criticism from the academy and the judiciary: criticism of its claim to
the status of constitutional law, of its practicability, of its democratic
legitimacy, and of its focus on economic effects. But despite the long
tradition of distinguished and thoughtful commentary associated with the
doctrine,2 scholarly and judicial writing has yet to fully confront the
change. This Article charts the remarkable decline of the dormant Commerce Clause, from the Traditional Framework to the modem reality.
In the following pages, we will see that since the mid-1980s the
Court has: (1) significantly narrowed the prohibition on discriminatory
state action to focus on "intentional" protectionism; (2) effectively retired the practice of "burden review" (in which a state measures adverse
impact on trade is weighed against its political or social benefit); and
(3) overseen the creation and expansion, with unprecedented speed, of a
series of exceptions to the reach of the doctrine. There are powerful reasons to suspect that this transformation is regrettable, but the primary
concern of this Article will be to reveal, rather than criticize, what the
Court has wrought in this area: to expose the astonishing decline4 of the
Traditional Framework.
The remainder of the Article is organized as follows. Part II summarizes the Traditional Framework. Part III charts that model's decline under the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts. Part IV concludes.
2.
For a very small cross-section of the more influential contributions in recent years, see
generally Dan T. Coenen, Business Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 107 YALE L.J.
965 (1998); Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 50 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 417 (2008); Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91

YALE L.J. 425 (1982); Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan 0. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, I10 YALE L.J. 785 (2001); Lisa Heinzerling, The Commercial Constitution, 1995
SUP. CT. REV. 217 (1995); Edmund W. Kitch, Regulation, The American Common Market and

Public Choice, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119 (1982); Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The
Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569
(1987); Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism:Making Sense of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986); Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant

Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 125 (1979); Norman R. Williams, The Foundations of the
American Common Market, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 409 (2008); Amy M. Petragnani, Comment,
The Dormant Commerce Clause: On Its Last Leg, 57 ALB. L. REV. 1215 (1994).
3.
See Daniel Francis, The Phantom Case Against the Dormant Commerce Clause (unpublished manuscript in preparation) (on file with author).
4.
During the preparation of this article for publication I had the pleasure of coming across
Charles Budd's thoughtful piece in Volume 4 of The State and Local Tax Lawyer, with a title in-

spired, like mine, by Edward Gibbon. Charles Budd, The Decline of the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause Halted?: Deer Park v. Harris County Appraisal District, 4 ST. & LOc. TAX LAW. 171
(1999). 1 have not thought it necessary to change my title as a result, but I gladly acknowledge Judge
Budd's work and his fine taste in article titles.
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II. THE TRADITIONAL FRAMEWORK

A. Overview and Fundamentals
The phrase "dormant Commerce Clause" refers to the inference that
the Interstate Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution ("The Congress
shall have Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce . .. among the several
States") is not only a basis for affirmative federal lawmaking, but also
precludes states from acting in certain ways that threaten trade among the
states. Under the Traditional Framework, the dormant Commerce
Clause prohibits three types of conduct: discrimination against interstate
or out-of-state interests; the imposition of unreasonable burdens upon
interstate commerce; and (occasionally) extraterritorialregulation.6 The
7
doctrine also applies in a distinctive fashion to taxation cases. We will
consider the Traditional Framework's treatment of each of these types of
state conduct in turn.
The dormant Commerce Clause can be invoked by any entitynatural or legal-injured by, or facing injury from, a state measure that it
forbids.8 This includes, for example: a person directly addressed by the
state measure;9 another state that has suffered impairment of "specific tax
revenues,"' 0 suffered other "direct injury,"" or whose citizens face "substantial economic injury"' 2 from the measure; a trade association,13 or a
state agency acting as a de facto trade association,1 4 representing interests
that are injured by the measure; or an entity otherwise suffering or facing
damage from the measure. 5
The doctrine may be invoked to challenge the conduct of states,
their agents, and their subdivisions,' 6 although probably not Native
American tribes.1 7 The Court has applied the dormant Commerce Clause

5.

BORIS I. BITTKER & BRANNON P. DENNING,

BITFKER ON THE REGULATION OF

INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE § 6.01-6.01[B] (2d rev. ed. 2012) (alteration in original).
6.
See id. § 6.02[B].
7.
See id. § 6.06[G].
8.
See, e.g., Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 468 (2005) (actual injury); Pennsylvania v.
West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593 (1923) (impending injury).
9. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 572-75
(1997) (taxed entity); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 388 (1994) (regulated entity); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 376-77 (1946) (criminal defendant).
10. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 448-54 (1992).
11.
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 562, 598
(1855).
12.
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 736-39 (1981); see also Wheeling & Belmont
Bridge Co., 262 U.S. (13 How.) at 591 (recognizing the right of a state to represent the interest of its
citizens).
13.
See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343-44 (1977).
14.
See id. at 344.
15. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 286 (1997); Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v.
Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 267 (1984).
16.
See, e.g., Associated Indus. of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 653 (1994).
17.
See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989); see also OtocMissouria Tribe of Indians v. N.Y. State Dep't of Fin. Servs., 769 F.3d 105, 117 n.9 (2d Cir. 2014)
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to a wide variety of measures, including civil statutes,' criminal stat19
221
utes,1 municipal and local ordinances,2 0 tax laws and tax
exemptions,
2
22
23
administrative orders, mayoral executive orders, and even contracting
practices 24 and policies adopted by state-owned businesses.25 As far as I
can tell, the Supreme Court has almost never entertained an effort to invoke the Commerce Clause against private entities (although there is one
unusual case that arguably constitutes an exception 26), even private entities exercising de facto regulatory authority or closely entangled in the
regulatory process.
A person is not precluded from invoking the dormant Commerce
Clause against that person's own state of citizenship or residence. 27 The
argument that in-staters have an adequate remedy at the polls, and that
they should accordingly be denied relief under the dormant Commerce
Clause and confined to "political" remedies, has been quite properly rejected by the Court, 28 although in some other cases the Court has indicated a troubling willingness to entertain it. 29 It has also featured in much
scholarly writing, where it is associated with the notion of "representation reinforce[ement]." 30 But the notion that access to dormant Commerce Clause litigation should be denied to anyone fairly represented in
the political process has mostly been-and certainly deserves to berejected, on at least two grounds: (1) the burden of anticompetitive state
regulation virtually always falls partly upon in-staters and partly upon
out-of-staters; and (2) the legality of state law cannot reasonably be made

(explaining that the Indian Commerce Clause does not contain a "dormant" dimension equivalent to
that found in the Interstate Commerce Clause).
18. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 440-41 (1992).
19. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 323-24 (1979); Morgan v. Virginia, 328
U.S. 373, 374-77 (1946).
20.

See, e.g., United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S.

330, 336-37 (2007) (plurality opinion); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383,
386-87 (1994).
21. See, e.g., Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 331-32 (2008) (plurality opinion);
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 281-82 (1997).
22.
See, e.g., W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 188, 190 (1994); New Eng.
Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 335, 337 (1982).
23.
See, e.g., White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Emp'rs, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 205-06 (1983).
24.
See, e.g., S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 84-86 (1984).
25.
See, e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 430, 432-33 (1980). But see discussion
infra Sections III.D.1-2 (arguing recent Supreme Court decisions have expanded the category of
state-owned enterprises that are excluded from the dormant Commerce Clause).

26.
In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 566-67, 572-73, 599-600 (1895).
27.
See, e.g., Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313, 326 (1890).
28.
W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 200 (1994); see also Comptroller of
Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1797-98 (2015).
29.
See, e.g., United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S.
330, 345 (2007) (plurality opinion); Wunnicke, 467 U.S: at 92; Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery
Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473 n.17 (1981).
30.
Eule, supra note 2, at 441-43; see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEw 83-84 (1980).
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to depend upon a court's armchair assessment of the political economy
of regulation within a state.3
B. Discrimination
Perhaps above all else, the dormant Commerce Clause prohibits
discrimination by a state in favor of its own commercial actors, interests,
or activities, to the detriment of interstate or out-of-state equivalents. 32
But a discriminatory measure is not automatically invalid. Rather, if the
Court concludes that a challenged measure is discriminatory in the relevant sense, it will turn to the question of whether that discrimination is
justified. The Court's justification analysis will be discussed in detail
below, but, in summary, discrimination is typically unlawful unless it is
justified by a "legitimate" regulatory objective and there is no reasonable, less discriminatory, alternative way to achieve that objective.33 The
party raising the dormant Commerce Clause challenge bears the burden
of showing a prima facie violation of the doctrine; once this burden has
been discharged, the burden then passes to the regulating state to establish a justification.34
In the language preferred by the Court, discrimination in the proscribed sense is "differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state [or
interstate] economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the
latter" 35 in such a way that affects a relationship of actual or potential
economic competition between the in-state and out-of-state interests.36
"Benefit" and "burden" are measured against a counterfactual world
without the measure: thus, a measure can discriminate by singling out
out-of-state or interstate interests for less favorable treatment,3 7 or by

31.
See, e.g., I LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1055 (3d ed. 2000)
("The concept of surrogate representation should be deployed with care, since its logic cannot easily
be contained."); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Poverty, Residency, and Federalism: States' Duty ofImpar-

tiality Toward Newcomers, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 277, 313 n.101 (1999) ("1 tend to be skeptical that
the Court could ever really figure out whether the burdened state residents will suffice to represent
out-of-state interests. After all, is there ever a case in which burdened out-of-state interests like
nonresident prospective home buyers have no proxy-real estate brokers, home builders, lenders,
and so on-for their interests?"); see also W Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 214-15 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) ("Analysis of interest group participation in the political process may serve many useful
purposes, but serving as a basis for interpreting the dormant Commerce Clause is not one of them.").

32.
See, e.g., Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1794; CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69,
87 (1987).
33.
Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338-39 (2008) (plurality opinion).
34.
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979); see also Hunt v. Wash. State Apple
Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977).
35.
United Haulers Ass'n, v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 338
(2007) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted); Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 472 (2005) (citations omitted).

36.

See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 300, 303 (1997) (holding a competi-

tive relationship is a prerequisite to a finding of discrimination); Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468

U.S. 263, 271 (1984); Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U.S. 199, 204-05 (1961).
37.
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 568, 574-76
(1997).
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depriving them of a competitive advantage that they would otherwise
38
have enjoyed.
Accordingly, the concept of "discrimination" is a broad one. What
we might call "partial" discrimination-discrimination in favor of a region of the regulating state, in favor of a few (or just one) in-stater(s), or
against only some other states-is treated just like "complete" discrimination and is unlawful. 39 This makes perfect sense as an anti-evasion
norm: absent such a rule, states could simply avoid the prohibition by
favoring large in-state regions or large groups of in-state actors. Also
caught is discrimination against states that fail (or refuse) to satisfy a
requirement of reciprocity with the regulating state.40
In the Court's jurisprudence, discrimination comes in two categories: (1) facial discrimination and (2) effect-based discrimination.
1. Facial Discrimination
When a measure facially or formally discriminates-that is, distinguishes on its face-against interstate or out-of-state commerce, entities,
or activities, it is caught by the dormant Commerce Clause and must be
justified as described below. 4 1 There is no de minimis exception to the
rule against facial discrimination. 42
The Court has applied this rule to a wide range of regulatory
measures, including: bans or prohibitions on interstate transactions; 43
taxes and charges on interstate transactions or activities in excess of
those applied to comparable internal ones;'4 less favorable tax treatment
38.
See, e.g., W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1994); Brown-Forman
Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 580 (1986); Hunt, 432 U.S. at 350-51;
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935).
See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 391 (1994) (one in39.
state actor favored); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep't of Nat. Res., 504 U.S. 353,
361 (1992) (preference for State subdivision impermissible); Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas,

458 U.S. 941, 957-58 (1982) (only certain States disfavored); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison,
340 U.S. 349, 350, 354 (1951) (requirement to process milk within five miles of center of Madison);
Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78, 82-83 (1891) (fee for inspection of meat of animals slaughtered
more than 100 miles from place of sale).

40.
See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 472-473; New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269,
276 (1988); Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 957-58; see also Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S.
366, 379 (1976). But see Cottrell, 424 U.S. at 371-72, 376 (analyzing reciprocity criterion using
Pike burden test).
41.
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 575-76; see also Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S.
324, 344 n.* (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Denning, supra
note 2, at 495.

42.
Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 455-56 (1992); Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468
U.S. 263, 269 (1984); see also Beer Inst., 491 U.S. at 344 n.*.
43. See, e.g., Granholm, 544 U.S. at 473; Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986); S.-Cent.
Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 84-86 (1984); New Eng. Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 339 (1982); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336-37 (1979); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 174 (1941).
44. See, e.g., Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 756 (1981); Bos. Stock Exch. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 332 (1977); Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 70
(1963).
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of products "because they are made in .. other States"; 45 application of
special and burdensome licensing (or similar) requirements to products
from out of state;46 regulation of third parties forcing them to deal, entirely or partly, with an in-state entity; 47 regulation of third parties making it
more expensive or burdensome for them to deal with out-of-state interests; 48 limitations on the types of transactions in which out-of-state parties can engage; 49 and procedural rules disfavoring out-of-state parties in
-50
litigation.
2. Effect-Based Discrimination
When a measure discriminates in its effect-that is, in its distribution of actual benefits and burdens-against interstate or out-of-state
interests, it must also be justified, just as if it were facially discriminatory. ' But effect-based discrimination is an elusive and controversial concept.
Every commentator makes his or her own effort to capture the
idea: here is mine. Effect-based discrimination occurs whenconsidering those bearing the burden of the regulation plus their competitors (whether or not the competitors are subject to the measure in question)-the burden created by a state measure correlates to or varies with
out-of-stateness. The burden of a regulation can correlate to out-ofstateness either in its incidence (i.e., interstate or out-of-state regulatees
are subject to the measure more often when undertaking an activity than
in-state regulatees undertaking the same activity or an equivalent 52) or in
its burden when incident (i.e., interstate or out-of-state regulatees are
subject to a heavier burden than in-state regulatees engaging in the same,
45. Limbach, 486 U.S. at 274; see also W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193
(1994); Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Enytl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994).
46. See, e.g., Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep't of Nat. Res., 504 U.S. 353,
359 (1992); Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389, 394-95 (1952); Welton
v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 279 (1875).
47. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 389-91 (1994);
Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 455; Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361, 376-77
(1964); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 403-06 (1948).
48.
See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 575-76
(1997) (tax exemption); Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 99 (surcharge); Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v.

Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 342 (1992) (fee).
49. See, e.g., Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 37-39 (1980) (finding discrimination where a Florida statute prohibited ownership of local investment or trust businesses by certain
types of out-of-state firms).

50.

See, e.g., Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 889 (1988)

("[T]he Ohio statute that suspends limitations protection for out-of-state entities is a violation of the

Commerce Clause."); Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S. 197, 202 (1914).
51.
Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454, 457 (1940) ("The freedom of commerce ...

is not

to be fettered by legislation, the actual effect of which is to discriminate in favor of interstate businesses, whatever may be the ostensible reach of the language." (footnote omitted)); Nippert v. City

of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 429-32 (1946).
52.
See, e.g., Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 271 (1984) (tax favoring fruit wine
and okolehao brandy); Best & Co., 311 U.S. at 456-57 (tax on merchants using hotel rooms to
secure retail orders); Nippert, 327 U.S. at 417-18, 431 (tax on itinerant solicitors).
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or an equivalent, activity 5 3 ). What matters here is the overall tendency of
the measure, not its impact in idiosyncratic individual cases. 54 An effectbased rule of this kind only makes practical sense if it incorporates a de
minimis exception: a trivial or momentary imbalance in competitive impact hardly warrants full-blown justification analysis.55
Note that my formulation does not reach, and is not intended to
reach, all forms of unequal regulatory burden. In particular, a rule against
effect-based discrimination, contoured as I have described it here, does
not imply that a burden is discriminatory in the proscribed sense just
because it applies mainly or even solely to out-of-state or interstate regulatees. I think this is a minority view: if I read them correctly, Brannon
Denning, Norman Williams, and Michael Lawrence see such measures
as discriminatory in the relevant sense; I do not.5 6 Such a situation can
arise, for example, when a state regulates an industry in which the activities or actors happen to be predominantly (or even exclusively) interstate
in nature: in such a case the regulation may burden that industry, but
among the set of regulatees and competitors no relative advantage is conferred on in-state interests. In such situations the Court tends-quite
rightly in my view-not to find discrimination. Consider, for example,
a state that did not produce milk, or a state with no mining or pharmaceutical companies of its own. Could that state regulate milk, or mining, or
pharmaceuticals, without immediately tripping over the dormant Commerce Clause and being forced to justify its regulatory scheme? I think
the answer should be "of course." So the question is not whether, in the
set of burdened regulatees, there are more out-of-staters than in-staters;
the question is whether in-staters tend to enjoy a better deal by comparison with out-of-state competitors (either because the in-staters face a
lighter burden or because they are less frequently burdened).
The Supreme Court has found effect-based discrimination, for example, when regulatory measures: favor or require the performance of
some action in-state, or in or near to some specific region of the state (a
requirement that, practically speaking, favors in-state entities, particular53.
See, e.g., Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 335, 353 (1977)
(prohibition on displaying State apple quality markings which operated to the particular detriment of
Washington apples).
54.
See, e.g., Nippert, 327 U.S. at 432.
55.
See, e.g., Regan, supra note 2, at 136 ("Protectionist effect . . cannot be made virtually
per se illegal... . There are just too many possible laws that are within the states' power on any
reasonable standard and that have some protectionist effect.").
56.
See Denning, supra note 2, at 514 (regarding such measures as discriminatory); Michael
A. Lawrence, Toward a More Coherent Dormant Commerce Clause: A Proposed Unitary Framework, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 395, 423-424 (1998); Williams, supra note 2, at 412, 412 n. 14.
57.
See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88 (1987); Commonwealth
Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1981); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437
U.S. 117, 125-26 (1978); Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172, 177-79 (1923); Heisler v.
Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245, 258 (1922). But see Exxon Corp., 437 U.S. at 135 (Blackmun,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing majority opinion for declining to find effectbased discrimination in such a case).
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ly those already located in or near the relevant area);58 favor some kind
of product or service produced solely or primarily in-state, by comparison with out-of-state substitutes or competitors; 59 or favor incumbents in
a state's internal market.6 0
3. Intentional Discrimination
Occasionally, one sees intentional or purposive discrimination listed
as a distinct third category of discrimination, along with facial and effectbased discrimination.61 But in truth, and setting aside a recent wave of
innovations upon the Traditional Framework that will be discussed in
detail below, 62 the Court's decisions generally do not focus on intention,
nor suggest that intention alone can render a measure troubling under the
dormant Commerce Clause.63
4. Justification of Discriminatory Regulation
The Court typically states that a discriminatory measure "will survive only if it advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives."" The
Court describes this test as one of the "strictest scrutiny," 65 and the regulating state carries the burden of proof.66 The justification analysis apparently includes a subjective component: in order to claim the benefit of a
justification, the Court seems to require that the state show that the justi58.
See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1994)
(citing cases); S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 84 (1984) (timber processing
required to be performed in-state); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951)
(Madison regulation that favored milk produced within five miles of Madison was unlawful discrim-

ination); Foster-Fountain Packaging Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 13 (1928); Minnesota v. Barber, 136
U.S. 313, 326 (1890) (meat examination required to be performed in-state); see also Pike v. Bruce

Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 138, 146 (1970) (fruit packaging required to be performed in-state).
59.
See, e.g., Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 271 (1984).
60.
See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949). But see Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 341 U.S. 329, 333 (1951) (upholding requirement
&

to obtain license before competing with an incumbent).
61.
See Regan, supra note 2, at 1092; see also Denning, supra note 2, at 502; Daniel K. Lee
Timothy P. Duane, Putting the Dormant Commerce Clause Back to Sleep: Adapting the Doctrine to

Support State Renewable Portfolio Standards, 43 ENVTL. L. 295, 306 (2013); Bradford C. Mank,
Are Public Facilities Different from Private Ones? Adopting a New Standard of Review for the

Dormant Commerce Clause, 60 SMU L. REv. 157, 163-64 (2007); Will Sears, Note, Full-Impact
Regulations and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 39 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 157, 163 (2014).
62.
See infra Section III.B.2 (charting the increasing focus on intention in recent cases).
63.
See infra Section III.B.1 (discussing traditional rejection of intention).

64.

Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008) (plurality opinion) (internal quota-

tion marks omitted) (citations omitted); see also United Haulers Ass'n. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid

Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 338-39 (2007) (plurality opinion); Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S.
460, 489 (2005); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 581-82
(1997); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994); Or. Waste Sys., Inc.
v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 100-01 (1994); Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S.
334, 342 (1992); New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988); Maine v. Taylor,
477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986).
65.
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 581 (citation omitted); Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S.
at 101 (citation omitted).

66.

Granholm, 544 U.S. at 492; Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138.
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fication in question actually motivated the measure and is not an ex post
rationalization.67 The Supreme Court often stresses the toughness of the
justification test by asserting that discriminatory measures are "virtually
per se invalid." 68
As actually applied, however, the justification analysis for discriminatory regulation is more permissive. It is split into two stages. In the
first stage, the state must identify a "legitimate purpose" for the discrimination, on a broad, permissive, and binary definition of "legitimate"
(much like rational basis scrutiny),69 and it must also show that the problem at which the regulation aims varies in some way with out-ofstateness.70
In the second stage, the state is required to show that its regulatory
solution varies with out-of-stateness in approximately the same way that
the problem does-that the skew of the measure broadly resembles the
skew of the underlying policy problem. Thus, a problem that is simply
"common to the several States" will not justify discrimination.7 ' And it
must be the problem itself, not the solution, that varies with out-ofstateness: the legislature cannot discriminate in order to address the in72
state piece of an evenly distributed problem. Such evenly distributed
problems-the need for food safety,73 the harms and losses from compe7576
74
tition, the scarcity of natural resources, the noxiousness of pollution,
the burdens of caring for the indigent,77 the risk of consumer confusion,
and so on-therefore cannot be solved with discriminatory regulation.79
By contrast, if the relevant problem is asymmetrically distributed across
67.

See, e.g., Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 457 (1992) (rejecting a proffered justifi-

cation because, among other things, it "finds no support in the records made in this case"); Kassel v.

Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662, 680 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring) (plurality
opinion) ("The burdens imposed on commerce must be balanced against the local benefits actually
sought to be achieved by the State's lawmakers, and not against those suggested after the fact by
counsel.").
68.
See, e.g., Davis, 553 U.S. at 338 (citations omitted).

69.
See, e.g., Taylor, 477 U.S. at 148; Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979).
See, e.g., Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep't of Nat. Res., 504 U.S. 353,
70.
367 (1992); Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 345-46 (1992).
71.
Chem. Waste Mgmt., 504 U.S. at 339-40, 348; see also City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978).
72.
For example, States have often discriminated against out-of-state interests simply because
they want to support and protect local businesses, consumers, charities, and resources. But, the Court
has recognized that to allow such "justifications" would be to trample the dormant Commerce

Clause into the mud. See W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 205 (1994); Bacchus
Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 272-73 (1984).
73.
See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 353-55 (1951).
See, e.g., W. Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 204-05; H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond,
74.
336 U.S. 525, 531-33 (1949); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
75.
See, e.g., New Eng. Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 338 (1982); Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337-38 (1979).
76.
See, e.g., City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 629.
77.
See, e.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 174-75 (1941).
78.
See, e.g., Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353-54 (1977).
79.
See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons, 336 U.S. at 538-39; Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel,
278 U.S. 1, 10 (1928); West v. Kan. Nat. Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 260 (1911).
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states, a differentiated approach may be justified. By requiring the regulatory solution to fit the policy problem, the Court essentially invites the
state to show that it is not in fact "discriminating" in the sense of treating
similar things dissimilarly, but instead responding even-handedly to an
asymmetric problem.80
C. Burden Review

'

Discrimination, while of central importance, does not exhaust the
concerns of the dormant Commerce Clause under the Traditional
Framework. The doctrine has also long been understood to have an aspect that is concerned purely with burden upon commercial activity. This
practice of burden review is currently known as the "Pike" doctrine after
a case in which its current formulation was prominently articulated.8
Under this approach, a measure is unlawful if its burdens are "clearly
excessive in relation to the [measure's] putative local benefits." 82 Note
the term "local" here: on at least two occasions the Court has indicated
that only benefits accruing to the regulating state's own citizens count as
"benefits" in the relevant sense. 83 (There is accordingly something of a
tension in dormant Commerce Clause law between the doctrine's antagonism to state discrimination against out-of-staters, on the one hand, and
its lack of receptivity to the notion that states might legitimately justify
regulatory decisions, at least in part, by reference to the interests of outof-staters, on the other.)
The Court approaches burden review with considerable deference,
and generally confines its applications of this rule to clear cases.m For
example, the Court invalidated non-discriminatory rules in Kassel v.
80.
See New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988) ("[The justification
analysis] is perhaps just another way of saying that what may appear to be a 'discriminatory' provision in the constitutionally prohibited sense-that is, a protectionist enactment-may on closer analysis
not be so."); City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 626-27 ("[W]hatever New Jersey's ultimate purpose,
it may not be accomplished by discriminating against articles of commerce coming from outside the
State unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently.").
81.
See generally Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). Note that burden review
emerged long before Pike. See infra Section III.C. 1.
82.
Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (citation omitted); see also Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S.
328, 338-39 (2008) (plurality opinion); United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste
Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 346 (2007) (plurality opinion); Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl.
Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994); Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 489 U.S. 493,
525-26 (1989); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643
(1982) (plurality opinion); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471-72 (1981);
City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 624.
83.
See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 93 (1987); Edgar, 457 U.S. at
644.
84.
See, e.g., Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 640 (1951) ("When there is a reasonable basis for legislation to protect the social, as distinguished from the economic, welfare of a
community, it is not for this Court because of the Commerce Clause to deny the exercise locally of
the sovereign power of Louisiana."), abrogatedby Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better
Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980); S.C. State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 189-91
(1938) (emphasizing the importance of judicial deference in the absence of discrimination); see also
Denning, supra note 2, at 422 & n.8 (noting that Pike calls for a "deferential balancing test").
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ConsolidatedFreightways Corp. of Delaware, when Iowa was unable
to muster any serious evidence that its exclusion of trucks beyond a certain length from its highways promoted safety; 8 6 in Raymond Motor
Transportation,Inc. v. Rice,87 when the "appellants produced a massive
array of evidence to disprove the State's assertion that the regulations
make some contribution to highway safety," while the State had "virtually defaulted in its defense of the regulations as a safety measure";88 and
in Bibb v. Navajo FreightLines, Inc.,89 when Illinois's requirement of the
use of curved mudguards on its highways, rather than the straight guards
required in most other states, created a burden on interstate commerce
that was "rather massive" while it was "conclusively shown" that the
curved guard conferred no advantages over the straight guard, and given
significant evidence that it actually introduced new dangers. 90 Each of
these was a clear case, leaving little room for a serious defense of the
reasonableness of the measure in question.
D. ExtraterritorialRegulation
A short but distinct line of cases applying the Traditional Framework prohibits states from directly regulating "commerce occurring
wholly outside the boundaries of [the] State."91 The key idea here, in a
hangover from an earlier version of dormant Commerce Clause doc92
trine, is directness: "The Commerce Clause .. . permits only incidental
regulation of interstate commerce by the States; direct regulation is prohibited." 93 Thus, a state measure purporting to affect activities wholly
outside the state-regulating, incentivizing, or penalizing them-may be
struck down. 94 Likewise, "a State may not adopt legislation that has the
practical effect of establishing a 'scale of prices for use in other
states," 95 and a state may not force an out-of-state merchant "to seek
regulatory approval in one State before undertaking a transaction in another." 96 This is so even if the relevant out-of-state activity itself has ef85.
450 U.S. 662, 671-74 (1981) (plurality opinion).
86.
Id.
434 U.S. 429 (1978).
87.
88.
Id. at 444.
89.
359 U.S. 520 (1959).
90.
Id. at 525, 528.
91.
Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989); see also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S.
624, 642-43 (1982) (plurality opinion) ("The Commerce Clause . .. precludes the application of a
state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders, whether or not the

commerce has effects within the State."); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935)
("New York has no power to project its legislation into Vermont by regulating the price to be paid in
that state for milk acquired there.").
92.
See infra Section III.A.2 (describing the direct/indirect burden test).

93.
Edgar, 457 U.S. at 640; see also Healy, 491 U.S. at 336.
See Beer Inst., 491 U.S. at 337-38; Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 521; Bowman v. Chi. & Nw. Ry.
94.
Co., 125 U.S. 465, 498 (1888).
95.
Beer Inst., 491 U.S. at 336 (quoting Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 528); see also id. at 337; BrownForman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 582 (1986); Baldwin, 294 U.S. at
521; Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Cb. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 575-77 (1886).
96.

Brown-Forman,476 U.S. at 582.
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fects within the regulating state-as it often will. 97 The Court has never
clearly explained whether such regulation is automatically invalid or
whether it may be justified.98
It must be said that the extraterritoriality doctrine-presented here
as part of the Traditional Framework, before the decision in Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America v. Walsh"-is a bit of an
oddball component of dormant Commerce Clause law. In many ways it
may be better thought of as a creature of the Due Process Clause, with
which it has often been entangled. 00 It may be right, as Goldsmith and
Sykes seem to suggest, that the "extraterritoriality" cases may be best
assimilated to the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, if at all, under the
rubric of burden review. 0 1
E. Tax Cases
For many years, the Court has approached taxation cases under a
specific doctrinal framework, rather different from that which applies to
"regulation" cases. The modem approach is adequately summarized by
the Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady 02 test requiring that a tax "[(1)]
is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State,
[(2)] is fairly apportioned, [(3)] does not discriminate against interstate
commerce, and [(4)] is fairly related to the services provided by the
State." 0 3
1. Substantial Nexus

-

Both the Due Process and Commerce Clauses require a connection
between a taxing state and-for an entity not domiciled in that state 0
any interstate activity that it seeks to tax.ios This is a minimal requirement, and it is established if the taxed entity "avails itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on business within the State,"'0 although the
Court has held that an entity lacking a physical presence within a state
97.

See, e.g., Edgar, 457 U.S. at 642-43.

98.

See Sears, supra note 61, at 172.

99.

538 U.S. 644 (2003).

100.

See Brannon P. Denning, Extraterritorialityand the Dormant Commerce Clause: A Doc-

trinal Post-Mortem, 73 LA. L. REV. 979, 980-83 (2013); Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays. (I) CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial

State Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1865, 1884-85 (1987); Williams, supra note 2, at 411-12
("[T]he Court ... has never made clear the connection between the dormant Commerce Clause and
that limitation on state action.").
101.
See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 2, at 804.

102.
430 U.S. 274 (1977).
103.
Id. at 279; accord D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 30 (1988); Maryland v.
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 754 (1981).
104.
An appropriate share of all the activities of an entity domiciled in a State is automatically
within the State's reach. See Hunt-Wesson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 528 U.S. 458, 464 (2000).

105.
Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1983); see also
Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 184 (1995).
106.
Exxon Corp. v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 220 (1980) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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but mailing goods into it from outside is not connected to the state by
such a nexus.10 7 A use tax may be levied on such shipped-in goods, but it
"must be collected from . . . the [in-state] customer, not the out-of-state
seller."'08 Justice Kennedy has recently called for this rule to be revisited
in an age of online retail.'0 9
The most interesting manifestation of the nexus doctrine-perhaps
not the very highest praise-concerns the ability of a state to reach the
out-of-state activities of an entity that undertakes some, but not all, of its
activities in-state. The basic rule is that a state can tax (an apportioned
share of" 0 ) out-of-state activity if the entity is domiciled in the state or,
for a nondomiciled entity, if the out-of-state activity is part of a "unitary
business" with the activity in the taxing state.'' Discrete business activities that are not part of a unitary business with the in-state operations of a
nondomiciliary entity may not be taxed."12
2. Fair Apportionment
A state that has a substantial nexus to an activity may only tax a
"fairly apportioned" share of the value of that activity." 3 This rule applies even, it seems, if the taxing state is the state of residence, although
the Court's precedents are not consistent on this point.1 4 This requirement has two components: internal consistency and external consisten-

107.
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992); Nat'l Bellas
Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967), overruled by Quill Corp. v. North Dakota
ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298 (1992); see also Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 124, 1127
(2015); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Sims, 191 U.S. 441, 450-51 (1903) ("[T]he fact that the price was
to be collected in North Carolina is too slender a thread upon which to hang an exemption of the
transaction from a rule which would otherwise declare the tax [unlawful].").

108.

Direct Mktg. Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. at 1134 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

109.
Id. at 1135 ("There is a powerful case to be made that a retailer doing extensive business
within a State has a sufficiently 'substantial nexus' to justify imposing some minor tax-collection
duty, even if that business is done through mail or the Internet.... The legal system should find an
appropriate case for this Court to reexamine Quill and Bellas Hess."); see also Robbins v. Taxing
Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 495 (1887) ("It may be suggested that the merchant or manufacturer has the
post-office at his command, and may solicit orders through the mails. We do not suppose, however,
that any one would seriously contend that this is the only way in which his business can be transacted without being amenable to exactions on the part of the state. Besides, why could not the state to
which his letters might be sent, tax him for soliciting orders in this way, as well as in any other

way?"), abrogatedby United States v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. 843 (1996).
110.

See infra Section II.E.2 (describing the fair apportionment requirement).

111.
MeadWestvaco Corp. ex rel. Mead Corp. v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 553 U.S. 16, 26 (2008);
Hunt-Wesson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 528 U.S. 458, 460-61 (2000); Allied-Signal, Inc. ex rel.
Bendix Corp. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768, 778 (1992).
112. Hunt- Wesson, 528 U.S. at 464.
113.
See, e.g., Comptroller of Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1795 (2015); Gwin, White
& Prince Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 439-40 (1939); J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S.
307, 308-11, 314 (1938).
114.
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1798-99; JD. Adams Mfg. Co., 304 U.S. at 311-12, 314. But see W.
Publ'g Co. v. McColgan, 328 U.S. 823 (1946) (per curiam), affg 166 P.2d 861, 864 (Cal. 1946);
Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 299-300 (1944).
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cy. 15 A formula is internally consistent if, supposing that it were adopted
by every state in the Union, it would not result in interstate commerce
being taxed more heavily than its intrastate equivalent.' 16 A formula is
externally consistent if the factors used in the formula "actually reflect a
reasonable sense of how income is generated."1 17 This test asks "whether
a State's tax reaches beyond that portion of value that is fairly attributable to economic activity within the taxing State."" If the tax satisfies the
criteria of internal and external consistency, it is fairly apportionedeven if, in fact, there is a risk or reality of "double taxation."" 9
3. Non-Discrimination
The dormant Commerce Clause prohibits tax discrimination against
interstate or out-of-state actors or activities. 120 This includes, for example, the application of higher taxation rates for out-of-state or interstate
activities,121 tax breaks and exemptions that favor in-state businesses or
interests,122 and rules that allow in-state businesses to reduce their tax
liability in ways that are denied to out-of-staters.123 The internal consistency rule, described above in connection with apportionment, can
also be understood to reflect a concern to avoid discriminatory taxation. 124 All the comments above regarding effect-based discrimination
are fully applicable in this context: indeed, many of those cases are taxa125
tion cases.

115.

Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 185 (1995) ("[W]e have as-

sessed any threat of malapportionment by asking whether the tax is internally consistent and, if so,
whether it is externally consistent as well." (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted)).

Id.; see also Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545 U.S. 429, 437
116.
(2005); Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 261 (1989), abrogated by Comptroller of Treasury v.
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015); Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169
(1983).
117.
ContainerCorp., 463 U.S. at 169.
118. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 185; see also Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 262 ("The external consistency test asks whether the State has taxed only that portion of the revenues from the interstate
activity which reasonably reflects the in-state component of the activity being taxed.").

119.
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1795, 1804; Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 191-92; Armco Inc. v.
Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 645-46 (1984); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 278-79 (1978);
Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 256 (1946), overruled by Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines,
Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1995); see also Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 58 (1920) (stating that double or
other "unequal" taxation is not per se prohibited by the federal Constitution), abrogated by Comp-

troller of Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015).
120.
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287 (1997); Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 197;
Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 70 (1963).
121. See, e.g., Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 342 (1992) (noting that a
taxing rule is discriminatory if it "'tax[es] a transaction or incident more heavily when it crosses
state lines than when it occurs entirely within the State' (quoting Armco, 467 U.S. at 642)).
122.
See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 587-88

(1997); New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 276 (1988); I.M. Darnell & Son Co. v.
City of Memphis, 208 U.S. 113, 125 (1908).
123.
See, e.g., S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160, 169 (1999).
124. See, e.g., Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1795, 1804; Armco, 467 U.S. at 644.
125.

See supra Section II.B.2 (explaining effect-based discrimination).
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This rule against discrimination is subject to an important caveat.
The "compensatory tax" doctrine provides that a tax, even if facially
discriminatory, may be sustained if its effect is to eliminate a distortion
that would otherwise result from the uneven incidence of another tax
enacted by the same state.1 26 The effect must be "simply to make interstate commerce bear a burden already borne by intrastate commerce";127
that is, by "impos[ing] a tax on a substantially equivalent event," it "assure[s] uniform treatment of goods and materials to be consumed in the
State." 2 8 A tax may survive on this ground if it: (1) is a compensation
for a tax separately imposed on intrastate activity; (2) approximates, but
does not exceed, the burden of that separate tax; and (3) taxes a "substantially equivalent" event that is sufficiently similar in substance, and mutually exclusive of, the event burdened by that separate tax.129 A compensatory tax may not go beyond compensation and result in discrimination that favors in-state interests.
The compensatory tax doctrine is a
form of justification: as such, the state bears the burden of proving applicability.'31
4. Fair Relation to Services Provided
Finally, "the Commerce Clause demands a fair relation between a
tax and the benefits conferred upon the taxpayer by the State."' 32 This is
a minimal threshold, asking only that "the measure of the tax must be
reasonably related to the extent of the contact" with the state. 33 The rule
resembles, and should probably be understood as, a manifestation of the
34
general framework for burden review described above.1

126. Associated Indus. of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 647 (1994); accord Henneford v.
Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 581 (1937). For an early parallel, see Hinson v. Lott, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 148, 152-53 (1868).
127. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331-32 (1996); accord Bos. Stock Exch. v. State
Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 331 (1977) (noting that the "common theme" is "[e]qual treatment of
interstate commerce").

128.

Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 759 (1981); see also Henneford, 300 U.S. at 584

("The one pays upon one activity or incident, and the other upon another, but the sum is the same
when the reckoning is closed.").
129.
Fulton Corp., 516 U.S. at 332-33 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Or. Waste

Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 104 (1994) ("[R]espondents' compensatory tax
argument fails because the in-state and out-of-state levies are not imposed on substantially equivalent events."); Armco, 467 U.S. at 643 (holding that "manufacturing and wholesaling are not 'substantially equivalent events' for the purposes of this analysis).

130.
131.
132.
133.

See, e.g., Lohman, 511 U.S. at 648-50.
Fulton Corp., 516 U.S. at 344.
Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 199 (1995).
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 626 (1981) (emphasis omitted);

see also Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 200 ("[The] fourth criterion asks only that the measure of the
tax be reasonably related to the taxpayer's presence or activities in the State."); Great N. Ry. Co. v.

Washington, 300 U.S. 154, 160-61, 168 (1937); Standard Oil Co. v. Graves, 249 U.S. 389, 395-97
(1919); Pure Oil Co. v. Minnesota, 248 U.S. 158, 162 (1918); D.E. Foote & Co. v. Stanley, 232 U.S.
494, 506 (1914).
134.

See supra Section II.C (explaining burden review).
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F. Congressional Override
Completing the picture is the proposition that the dormant Commerce Clause offers a rare example of judicial review without judicial
supremacy: Congress may authorize what the Court has forbidden or
would forbid, 35 by expressing such an intention "unambiguousl1y]."l 3 6
Justice Scalia called this feature of the doctrine "utterly illogical," and
asked: "How could congressional consent lift a constitutional prohibition?" 137 Amy Petragnani has raised the same criticism.' But this difficulty recedes if the provision for congressional override is understood as
an element of the constitutional command, not an exception to it in the
strict sense.1 39 Of course, whether it can fairly be understood this way is
a separate question.
III.

THE STRANGE DEATH OF THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE"

My central claim in this Article is that, since the mid-1980s, the Supreme Court has continued to pay lip service to the Traditional Framework while, in fact, dramatically eroding it. This argument has three
components, each corresponding to a dimension of doctrinal change.
First, while the Court's rhetoric on discrimination broadly conforms to
the Traditional Framework outlined above, in practice the Court's willingness to respond to discrimination has dwindled dramatically, and today discriminatory regulation will only raise serious dormant Commerce
Clause issues when it amounts to intentional protectionism. Second, the
Court has effectively retired the practice of burden review. Third, exceptions to the doctrine-zones of complete immunity from the reach of the
dormant Commerce Clause-are being created and expanded at an unprecedented rate.
This Part might well have been entitled "Regan's Victory" to honor
the fact that the first and second of these three dimensions of change
closely resemble the doctrinal model that Donald Regan promoted in his

135.
See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138-39 (1986); S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v.
Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87-88 (1984); Grp. Life & Health Ins. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205,
218 n.18 (1979); Prudential Ins. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 425 (1946); S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex
rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S.
(13 How.) 421,431 (1855).
136.
E.g., Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 458 (1992); Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138-40; see
also Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 91; Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 960 (1982);
New Eng. Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 343 (1982).
137.
Comptroller of Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1808 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
see also Benjamin, 328 U.S. at 426 (questioning the effectiveness of congressional consent); Cooley

v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 321 (1851) (doubting the effectiveness of congressional
consent), abrogatedby Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1995).
138.
Petragnani, supra note 2, at 1245-46.
139.
But see Denning, supra note 2, at 496 (describing congressional override as an exclusion
or exception from the doctrine).
140.
I allude here to GEORGE DANGERFIELD, THE STRANGE DEATH OF LtBERAL ENGLAND

(1935).
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1986 article Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause.141 That
article made the descriptive claim that the Supreme Court had already
adopted this doctrinal model: a claim that was surely premature at the
time, although the law has aligned with Regan's prescription in the intervening years. But even Regan could not foresee the third dimension of
the decline: the astonishing proliferation of exemptions and exceptions to
the doctrine. My argument also falls in line with the prescient work of
Amy Petragnani, who spotted the emerging trend in 1994 and argued
then that "the Court has . . . begun to realize the fallacy of the dormant
Commerce Clause," leaving the doctrine on its "last leg." 4 2
Many lower courts continue to articulate the Traditional Framework
in its customary form: a rule against discrimination and a rule against
unreasonable burden.1 43 But this Part, picking up where Regan and Petragnani left off, will demonstrate just how significantly the Supreme
Court has undermined and weakened that model in its own adjudicative
practice.
A. Background: Four Models ofDormant Commerce Clause Doctrine
It may be helpful to briefly recap, at least in very broad strokes, the
evolution of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine since it first raised
its head in the famous trilogy of Gibbons v. Ogden,'" Brown v. Marylandl45 and Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co.'" The doctrine's
roots are long, deep, and tangled: even a basic history of its evolution
could occupy dozens of pages. Rather than undertake that exercise, this
section will offer thumbnail sketches of the four basic doctrinal models
that have-in very approximate sequence and with plenty of messy overlap between them in practice-dominated adjudication of the Commerce
Clause's preclusive shadow. Doctrinal detail will be set aside in this section, as well as the wealth of social and political context that framed the
doctrine's evolutionary progress, along with the entire question of original understanding.1 47 In the interests of clarity of exposition the models
141.
142.

See Regan, supra note 2, at 1093.
Petragnani, supra note 2, at 1216.

143. See, e.g., Richland/Wilkin Joint Powers Auth. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 826 F.3d
1030, 1042 (8th Cir. 2016) (describing the Traditional Framework); Int'l Franchise Ass'n v, City of
Seattle, 803 F.3d 389, 399 (9th Cir. 2015); Amerijet Int'l, Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cty., 627 F. App'x
744, 752 (1 Ith Cir. 2015).
144.
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
145. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
146.
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
147.
The relevant literature on the history of the Commerce Clause in general and its dormant
dimension in particular is voluminous, and it defies any attempt at curation. See, e.g., FELIX
FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY, AND WAITE 1 (1937); CURTIS
P. NErELS, THE EMERGENCE OF A NATIONAL ECONOMY: 1775-1815, at 98-101 (1962); Albert S.
Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary Comment, 25

MINN. L. REV. 432, 432 (1941); Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (2010);
Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1387-88
(1987); Barry Friedman & Daniel T. Deacon, A Course Unbroken: The ConstitutionalLegitimacy of

the Dormant Commerce Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 1877, 1880-84 (2011); Grant S. Nelson & Robert J.
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will be organized by reference to the approximate period of their ascendancy and prominence. In practice, of course, different models overlap
with and shade into one another, and the language and logic of adjudication change gradually and messily. The following should be understood
as nothing more than a gross simplification for heuristic purposes.
1. First Model: Interstate Commerce as Organizing Principle (c.
1820s-1890s)
From the 1820s onward, the Court grappled with the question of
whether-and if so to what extent-the Commerce Clause cast an exclusionary shadow upon the regulatory powers of the states. Beginning with
some initial, tentative ventures into the problem, 148 the Court arrived at
the principle that states may not regulate or tax interstate commerce at
all, but remained free to exercise their "police power" to regulate things
other than "commerce," and to regulate commerce that was not "interstate" in nature. 149 These two terms, of course, had not yet acquired their
modem breadth.1 5 0

This approach placed a great deal of analytical strain on the notion
that regulations of interstate commerce, on the one hand, and exercises of
the local police power, on the other, could consistently be distinguished
from one another. As we now recognize, "[1]ocal concern and infringement of national interest are not mutually exclusive categories." 5 1 With

the increasing modernization of the nation's economy, the notion that
states could not regulate or tax interstate commerce at all-and the rules
created to define the boundary, such as the bizarre "original package"
rule 52--became unsustainable. A crucial moment arrived with the
Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause. Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REv. 1, 7-13 (1999).

148. See, e.g., Smith v. Turner (The Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 214-19, 221-22
(1849); The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 522-24 (1847), overruled in part by Leisy v.
Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890), superseded by statute, 27 U.S.C. § 121 (1890), as recognized in
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005); Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 15759 (1837); Willson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 251-52; Brown, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 447-49; Gibbons, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 161-71.
149.
See, e.g., Robbins v. Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 497 (1887) ("Interstate commerce cannot
be taxed at all, even though the same amount of tax should be laid on domestic commerce, or that
which is carried on solely within the state."), abrogatedby United States v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp.,

517 U.S. 843 (1996); Reading R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania (In re State Freight Tax), 82 U.S. 232, 279
(1872) ("[I]f such a tax is in effect a regulation of interstate commerce, the conclusion seems to be
inevitable that it is in conflict with the Constitution of the United States."), abrogated by Okla. Tax

Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1995); Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449,
505 (1841) (McLean, J., concurring) ("[T]he commercial power, as it regards . . . commerce among
the several states, has been decided . . . to be exclusively vested in congress.").
See, e.g., Abel, supra note 147, at 481; Epstein, supra note 147, at 1393-95; Robert G.
150.
Natelson, The Legal Meaning of "Commerce" in the Commerce Clause, 80 SAINT JOHN'S L. REV.

789, 805-06 (2006). But see Balkin, supra note 147, at 15-21 (defending a broad view of "commerce" as originally understood).
151.
Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1940).

152.

See, e.g., Brown, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 441-42 (applying the Import-Export Clause and

holding that "when the importer has so acted upon the thing imported, that it has become incorporated and mixed up with the mass of property in the country, it has, perhaps, lost its distinctive
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Court's statement in the 1851 Cooley v. Board of Wardens1 53 decision
that the power to regulate interstate commerce was exclusively in the
hands of Congress with respect to some matters, but shared with the
states with respect to other matters.'5 The federal monopoly on the regulation of interstate commerce was broken, and a new analytical approach
would be required.
2. Second Model: Directness and Discrimination as Organizing
Principles (c. 1870s-1930s)
The analytical framework that emerged after Cooley proved influential and enduring. As the Court appreciated that the old test was a hopeless fit with an integrated economy,' 55 the Court articulated one better
suited to the Gilded Age. The new model turned not on whether interstate commerce was affected, but on the nature of the state measure.
States could not-even through the police power-"directly" regulate,
burden, or tax interstate commerce,156 and could not discriminate against
interstate commerce.' 57 Conversely, state regulations that merely "indirectly" or "incidentally" burdened interstate commerce were lawful, as
long as the indirect burden was not unreasonable.' 58 This language endured long into the twentieth century, although the Court continued to
apply a definition of "commerce" that fell far short of its modem
breadth. 5 9

3. Third Model: Discrimination and Reasonableness as Organizing
Principles (c. 1930s-1980s)
All formalisms are born to die, and eventually the Court recognized
that there was no workable way to distinguish between direct and indicharacter as an import, and has become subject to the taxing power of the State; but while remaining
the property of the importer, in his warehouse, in the original form or package in which it was imported, a tax upon it is too plainly a duty on imports to escape the prohibition in the constitution");

see also Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123, 138-40 (1868) (overruling the original package
rule as inapplicable to imports from another state).

153.
154.
155.

53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319-20 (1851).
Id
Compare Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99, 103 (1876) (acknowledging that local police-

power regulation "might indirectly affect the commerce of the country," but that it need not be
automatically unlawful on that account), with Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S.
557, 575 (1886) (emphasizing the converse proposition that even a regulation confined to the limits
of a State may violate the Commerce Clause when it burdens "transportation which constitutes a part
of commerce among the states").

See, e.g., Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Taylor, 216 U. S. 262, 276 (1910); Atl. Coast
156.
Line R.R. Co. v. Wharton, 207 U. S. 328, 334 (1907); Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U.S. 485, 488 (1877).
See, e.g., Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434, 439 (1879); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275,
157.
282 (1875); Woodruff, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 140.
See, e.g., Bourjois, Inc. v. Chapman, 301 U.S. 183, 187-88 (1937); Buck v. Kuykendall,
158.
267 U.S. 307, 315 (1925); Barrett v. City of New York, 232 U.S. 14, 31 (1914); Savage v. Jones,
225 U.S. 501, 525 (1912); West v. Kan. Nat. Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 262 (1911).
E.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303 (1936) (holding that "the incidents
159.
leading up to and culminating in the mining of coal" are not "commerce"); United States v. E.C.
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895) (differentiating "commerce" from "manufacture").

276

DENVER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:2

rect (or incidental) regulation of commerce.'1 Eventually it was replaced
with what I have called the Traditional Framework, rooted in a turn toward an effects-based, fact-sensitive analysis of the regulation's practical
consequences. 161
This third model emerged with the New Deal in the late 1930s and
1940s, while a broadly similar transformation was famously occurring in
affirmative Commerce Clause jurisprudence.1 62 In dormant Commerce
Clause law, it was most clearly inaugurated in by Justice Stone in two
cases. The first was South CarolinaState Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros.1 6 3 in 1938, in which Justice Stone emphasized that the Commerce Clause "prohibits discrimination against interstate commerce,
whatever its form or method," heavily hinting that discrimination implied
at least presumptive illegality, regardless of whether it was "direct."'6
The second was Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan 65in
1945, returning to the proposition (owing much to the practical logic of
Cooley'6) that "there is a residuum of power in the state to make laws
governing matters of local concern which nevertheless in some measure
affect interstate commerce or even, to some extent, regulate it," indicating that even state regulation of interstate commerce that was arguably
"direct" could be lawful.167 Completing the picture, the Court went on to
explain that even for non-discriminatory rules, the analytical key was
"the nature and extent of the burden which the state regulation ... imposes on interstate commerce" and "the relative weights of the
state and national interests involved."1 6 8 The Traditional Framework-a
rule against discrimination and a rule against unreasonable burden-was
born.

160.

E.g., Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 635 n.19 (1951) ("'Incidental' as a test

has not continued as a useful manner for determining the validity of local regulation of matters
affecting interstate commerce."), abrogatedby Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't,

444 U.S. 620 (1980).
161. E.g., W. Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 259 (1938) ("Practical rather
than logical distinctions must be sought.").

162. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 123-24 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100, 119-22 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1937). Note
that the traditional "switch in time" narrative of the New Deal Supreme Court has been refined in
recent years. See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and
Balance in the InterjurisdictionalGray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 636 (2007) ("[H]istorians have
largely set to rest the 'switch-in-time-that-saved-nine' mythos .... " (footnote omitted)).

163.
164.
165.
166.
Comm'n
167.
168.

303 U.S. 177 (1938).
Id. at 185-86.
325 U.S. 761 (1945).
Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851), abrogatedby Okla. Tax
v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1995).
S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 767.
Id at 770-71 (emphasis added).
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4. Fourth Model: Intentional Discrimination as Organizing Principle (c. 1980s-Present)
In the fourth model, which I claim has emerged from the jurisprudence of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts as a consequence of the collapse of the Traditional Framework, the zone of presumptive illegality
has been narrowed to a rule against intentional protectionism, and burden
review has decayed into minimal rational basis review at best. The migration from the third to the fourth phase will be the subject of the rest of
Part III.
To summarize my account, this development begins in and around
the 1980s. In what might be read as a reaction against the "age of balancing" that emerged in the years before, as well as a cousin of the "New
Federalism" drive to revive state regulatory autonomy,169 a remarkable
outpouring of influential critical attacks on the Traditional Framework
erupted at the end of the 1970s and through the 1980s.1 70 Then came the
changes of judicial personnel: 1986 saw both the accession to the Court
of Justice Scalia (soon to be established as a prominent critic of the
dormant Commerce Clause) and the elevation of Justice Rehnquist (an
outspoken defender of state autonomy) to the position of Chief Justice.
With the arrival in 1991of Justice Thomas-today the leading critic of
the doctrine-the stage was set for the doctrine's remarkable decline.
We will consider in turn the three dimensions of the long fall of the
dormant Commerce Clause: the retreat from the rule against discrimination; the retreat from burden review; and the proliferation of exceptions
and immunities.
B. The Decline of the Rule Against Discrimination
1. The Traditional Irrelevance of Intention
Throughout the life of the dormant Commerce Clause-up to and
throughout the period in which the Traditional Framework emerged-the
Court has overwhelmingly rejected subjective intention as a criterion of
legality for a state law challenged under the Commerce Clause, and-focused instead on the effect of the measure. 171 To be sure, there are several
169.
See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
943, 963-71 (1987) (charting the development and proliferation of balancing frameworks).
170.
See infra notes 193-96 and accompanying text (noting academic criticism of the Traditional Framework in the late 1970s and early 1980s).

171.
See Associated Indus. of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 653 (1994); Brown-Forman
Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986); City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626 (1978); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 35253 (1977); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970); Halliburton Oil Well Cementing
Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 72 (1963); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 353-54
(1951); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10 (1928); Di Santo v. Pennsylvania,
273 U.S. 34, 37 (1927), overruled on other grounds by California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 11415 (1941); Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245, 259 (1922); Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S.
313, 320 (1890); Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 268 (1875); In re State Freight
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examples of dicta and occasional holdings to the contrary,1 72 but subjective purpose, in the sense of what the state legislature or regulator actually thought or intended, has been rejected in the overwhelming majority
of dormant Commerce Clause cases. I do not propose to say much more
about this proposition, which I think generally uncontroversial. Even
Donald Regan, who analyzes the Court's modern cases through the lens
of subjective intentional protectionism, makes no claim that a concern
with intentional protectionism motivated the Court's case law before
1935.173 However, as this Section will show, the Court has abandoned
this long-held position, and has come to embrace the kind of intent-based
analysis that Regan himself proposed.
2. The Retreat from the Rule Against Discrimination
The first element of the retreat from the Traditional Framework was
a profound softening and blunting of the rule that discriminatory
measures-whatever their subjective purpose-presumptively violate the
dormant Commerce Clause. Over a long arc of recent cases, the Court
has repeatedly ignored effect-based discrimination-and even, in some
cases, facial discrimination-in cases lacking evidence of some kind of
undesirably "protectionist" frame of mind on the part of the relevant state
actor.
The Court's 1977 decision in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commissionl74 exemplifies the treatment of discrimination under the Traditional Framework.' 7 5 Washington's apples are-or wereso good that Washington had its very own system of quality grading.17 6
But the North Carolina Board of Agriculture neutralized this advantage
(at least in North Carolina) when it prohibited the use of any quality
grade markings other than the USDA's: thenceforth, apples in North
Carolina would have to bear the USDA's markings alone or none at
all. 17 7 This rule, though not facially discriminatory, had the effect of depriving the Washington apples of the advantage of their own superior
Tax, 82 U.S. 232, 276 (1872), abrogatedby Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S.
175 (1995); Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123, 140 (1868); The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5
How.) 504, 583 (1847) (Taney, C.J., announcing the judgment of the Court), overruled in part by
Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890), superseded by statute, 27 U.S.C. § 121 (1890), as recognized
in Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005); see also United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer
Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 366-67 (2007) (Alito, J., dissenting) (plurality opinion)
(emphasizing that the doctrine is not focused on the legitimacy of a measure's goals).

172.
See, e.g., McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709, 1719-20 (2013); Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v.
Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 531 (1949);
Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422, 425-27 (1936); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294
U.S. 511, 522 (1935); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1925); Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237
U.S. 52, 60 (1915); Engel v. O'Malley, 219 U.S. 128, 139 (1911); Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S.
(3 Wall.) 713, 727 (1865).
173.

Regan, supranote 2, at 1094.

174.
175.
176.
177.

432 U.S. 333 (1977).
Id.
Id. at 336.
Id. at 337.
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quality (or, at least, their superior quality markings). Recognizing that
this was effect-based discrimination, the Court condemned the measU .178
ure.17

The Court in Hunt was assisted by more than a whiff of intentional
protectionism-there was clear evidence that the measure was enacted, at
least in significant part, in order to serve the commercial interests of the
North Carolina apple industry. Consistent with the Traditional Framework, the Court denied that the finding of intention had independent legal significance, but was sure to point it out anyway:
Despite the statute's facial neutrality, the Commission suggests that
its discriminatory impact on interstate commerce was not an unintended byproduct and there are some indications in the record to that
effect. The most glaring is the response of the North Carolina Agriculture Commissioner to the Commission's request for an exemption
following the statute's passage in which he indicated that before he
could support such an exemption, he would 'want to have the sentiment from our apple producers since they were mainly responsible
for this legislation being passed['].... However, we need not ascribe
an economic protection motive to the North Carolina Legislature to
resolve this case; we conclude that the challenged statute cannot
stand ... even if enacted for the declared purpose of protecting consumers from deception and fraud in the marketplace. 179
But a thin crack in the Traditional Framework could be discerned
the following year when the Court decided City of Philadelphiav. New
Jersey so in 1978. In that case, the Court confronted an example of facial
discrimination-a New Jersey statute that prohibited the import of waste
from out-of-statel 81-and
condemned it as such under the dormant
Commerce Clause.1 82 The significant move here was not the Court's
holding, but its language. Recall that the Traditional Framework involves
two prohibitions (setting aside the rule against extraterritoriality): a rule
against discrimination, which prohibits both facial and effect-based discrimination, and a rule against unreasonable burden. But in City of Philadelphia the Court commented that "where other legislative objectives
are credibly advanced and there is no patent discrimination against interstate trade, the Court has adopted a much more flexible approach, the
general contours of which were outlined in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc."183
Notice the implicit move: no longer is burden review contrasted with a
rule against discrimination; it is contrasted with a rule against some narrower category of "patent" discrimination.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 350-51.
Id. at 352-53.
437 U.S. 617 (1978).
Id. at 618.
Id. at 629.
Id. at 624 (citation omitted).
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Doctrine was to follow where rhetoric led, and the next step came in
1981 with Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.'" Minnesota had
banned the sale of milk at retail in plastic nonreturnable, nonrefillable
containers, but allowed the sale of milk at retail in non-plastic nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers, such as those made out of paperboard,
relying on a series of studies of the ecological and environmental impact
of plastic containers.' 85
In principle, such a measure seems unobjectionable. But in practice
the measure's effects were massively discriminatory in favor of in-state
business. The prohibited plastic containers were produced entirely outof-state, while the pulpwood used for making the paperboard substitutes
was a "major Minnesota product."1 86 Yet the legislation was, apparently,
"genuinely proposed for environmental reasons."' 87 So the Court here
was confronted with discriminatory effects but (supposedly) good intentions. Did it call out the effect-based discrimination, as it had in Hunt?
Not at all. The Court emphasized repeatedly that the measure was nondiscriminatory-that is, not that it was a justified example of discrimination, but actually non-discriminatory-and so applied deferential burden
review instead.' 88 The measure survived.
Clover Leaf thus suggested that the rule against discrimination
might contain a penumbral region in which state conduct, while discriminatory, was not the kind of "patent" discrimination with which the
dormant Commerce Clause was primarily concerned. Discriminatory
conduct in this penumbra would be treated more leniently than the "patent" variety. But it remained unclear whether this approach was a passing aberration, or-if not-how the boundary between the core and the
penumbra would be defined. Did "patent discrimination" mean facial
discrimination, intentional discrimination, or something else?
A further hint came in 1984's Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,18 9 in
which the Court demonstrated that it would strike down discrimination
even if it was not facial so long as protectionist animus was obviously
present. In that case, a Hawaii regulation that, while facially neutral, discriminated in favor of okolehao brandy and fruit wine (whether in-state
or out-of-state). and against competing liquors (whether in-state or out-ofstate)-a kind of facial neutrality that was fooling no-one about its true
The Court reaffirmed the orthodoxy that "discrimination" in
purpose.
the proscribed sense was present whenever the purpose or effect of the

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

449 U.S. 456 (1981).
Id. at 458-60.
Id. at 473.
Id. at 463 n.7.
Id. at 471-74.
468 U.S. 263 (1984).
Id. at 265.
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relevant measure was discriminatory.191 But the Court's opinion nevertheless laid great emphasis on the purpose of the measure, rebutting at
length the state's arguments that "there was no discriminatory intent"
behind it. 192

Meanwhile, momentum had been building for a change in the
dormant Commerce Clause's doctrinal framework. The ground had been
prepared for such a change by a series of vigorous academic attacks on
what was perceived as the indeterminacy and illegitimacy of the Traditional Framework. Influential examples included Mark Tushnet's advocacy in 1979 of an approach that would have required the Court to intervene only when economic and political analysis indicated some dysfunction in the state legislative process; 193 Edmund Kitch's attack on the doctrine in 1981 as an idea of "absolutely no merit"; 19 4 and Julian Eule's
narrow account of the doctrine that built on Ely's "representation reinforcement" model.1 95 In addition, the groundswell of New Federalism
was rising, with increasing support for state regulatory autonomy. 196 After some changes to the Court's organization-the elevation of Justices
Scalia and Thomas to the Court (in 1986 and 1991 respectively), and
Justice Rehnquist's ascension to the Chief Justiceship (in 1986)-it
would soon arrive in a string of well-known decisions that would inaugurate a new era in federalism jurisprudence. 197 The dormant Commerce
Clause, likewise, seemed ripe for re-evaluation.
It was in this climate that Donald Regan published Making Sense of
the Dormant Commerce Clause in 1986.19 In this remarkably influential
(and lengthy) article, Regan argued that the Supreme Court had in fact
been concerned only with what he called purposeful economic protectionism in its previous decisions, and that it should in principle be doing
just that. In his words, "[In] movement-of-goods cases . .. the Court has
been concerned exclusively with preventing states from engaging in purposeful economic protectionism," 99 and that is "what the Court should
do and is doing." 200 Regan argued that a "court should strike down a state
law if and only if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that protectionist purpose on the part of the legislators contributed substantially to
191.
192.

Id. at 270.
Id. at 272-73.

193.
194.
195.

Tushnet, supra note 2, at 125.
Kitch, supranote 2, at 123.
Eule, supra note 2, at 427-28.

196.

The history of "New Federalism" is widely chronicled. See generally Richard H. Fallon,

Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.

429, 429-31 (2002); Paul D. Moreno, "So Long as Our System Shall Exist": Myth, History, and the
New Federalism, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 711, 711 (2005); Ryan, supranote 162, at 539-67.
197.
See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
U.S. 452 (1991); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1987).
198.
199.

Regan, supra note 2, at 1092-93.
Id. at 1092 (internal quotation marks omitted).

200.

Id at 1099.
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the adoption of the law or any feature of the law."201 And "protectionism" was an "improvement (caused by the statute) in the competitive
position of some class of local economic actors vis-it-vis their foreign
* ,,202
In later work, he would double down on this subjectivist
competitors.
approach: "[W]hat we should be concerned with is 'subjective' intent. ... It is a matter of what happens in the legislative halls in the generation of the law, not a matter of the consequences." 203 Regan's rule
condemned measures motivated by protectionist purpose unless they
were not "analogous in form to the traditional instruments of protectionism-the tariff, the quota, or the outright embargo," a murky proviso
which helped to accommodate deviations from his rule.20 4
Was Regan's diagnosis premature? I think so. In 1986, although the
Court was certainly giving signals that it was starting to move in this
direction, the descriptive component of his claim was a real stretch. The
Court had explicitly disclaimed any reliance on intention as recently as
Hunt,205 and even in Bacchus Imports-in which intention was prominent-the Court had stated that either "discriminatory purpose or discriminatory effect" would be enough to classify a measure as discriminatory, indicating that discriminatory purpose was not necessary. 206 More
pointedly, the footnoted admission in Clover Leaf that legislators had
won votes for the measure by emphasizing its "beneficial side effects on
state industry" 207 (indicating protectionist purpose as the Court had defined it in Bacchus Imports 208) would put it on the wrong side of the line
that Regan himself seemed to be drawing: it certainly sounded like protectionist purposes had at least "contributed substantially to the adoption
of the [discriminatory law in Clover Leaf].
Two decisions that shortly preceded Regan's article gave further
grounds to doubt his descriptive claim. In 1984's Edgar v. AHTE
Corp.,2 10 the Court had condemned a non-discriminatory anti-takeover

201.
202.

Id. at 1148.
Id. at 1095.

203.
Donald H. Regan, JudicialReview ofMember-State Regulation of Trade Within a Federal
or Quasi-FederalSystem: Protectionism and Balancing, Do Capo, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1853, 1885

(2001).
204.
Regan identifies the key features of such laws as their protectionist effect (their relative
competitive promotion of local industry), their explicitness, and their protectionist purpose. Regan,
supra note 2, at 1095, 1201-02 (identifying a wide range of rules as "obviously sufficiently analogous in form to tariffs, embargoes, or quotas" without explanation).

205.
206.
207.

Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350-51 (1977).
Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984) (citation omitted).
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463 n.7 (1981).

208.
See Bacchus Imps., 468 U.S. at 273 ("[I]t is irrelevant to the Commerce Clause inquiry
that the motivation of the legislature was the desire to aid the makers of the locally produced beverage rather than to harm out-of-state producers.").
209.
Compare Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. at 463 n.7, with Regan, supra note 2, at
1148 ("The question is whether legislators shared the protectionist purpose.").

210.

457 U.S. 624 (1982).
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statute that was marked by no indication of protectionist purpose.2 1 1
Likewise, in 1982's decision in Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas,2 12
the Court had analyzed a water-conservation measure that was facially
discriminatory, and condemned it without any suggestion that the measure was motivated by improper protectionist purpose-or indeed by anything at all other than the "unquestionably legitimate and highly important" one of conserving resources for reasons unrelated to competitive
preference.213
So in light of this background, and in light of the Court's long history of rejecting intention as a guide to legality under the dormant Commerce Clause,214 Regan's descriptive claim was less than fully convincing. But his retrospective reclassification of earlier cases into an intentional-protectionism framework provided an intellectual model of enormous appeal to a Court that was ready to take the path he indicated. Regan's use of epicyclical devices, like the "analogous in form" proviso,
and his exclusion of taxing and transportation cases, helped to explain
deviations from the "true" path of intentional protectionism.
Regan's intervention found a receptive audience. Almost immediately, in 1987's CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,215 the Court
cited his work for the proposition that "[t]he principal objects of dormant
Commerce Clause scrutiny are statutes that discriminate against interstate commerce."216 Justice Scalia, newly arrived on the Court, made a
point of specifically endorsing his views in a concurring opinion.217 Regan's work had made an immediate contribution to the fulfillment of its
own prophecy.
And sure enough, after CTS Corp., the Court moved more decidedly
toward a subjective purpose standard. The next crucial development
came the very next year, with 1988's New Energy Co. of Indiana v.
Limbach,218 in which the Court condemned a facially discriminatory
tax-a tax exemption that applied only to ethanol produced in Ohio-in
an opinion written by Justice Scalia which saw Regan's view clearly
expressed in doctrinal form.219 Justice Scalia was later to emerge as an
aggressive critic of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, 220 but in his
211.

See id. at 630-31. Regan himself acknowledged that Edgar did not fit his theory, and

declined to take it at face value. Regan, supranote 2, at 1279.

212.
213.

458 U.S. 941 (1982).
Id. at 954-55, 960.

214.

See supra note 171 (collecting cases).

215.
216.

481 U.S. 69 (1987).
Id. at 87.

217.

Id. at 95-96 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

218.
219.
220.

486 U.S. 269 (1988).
Id. at 271.
See, e.g., Comptroller of Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1807 (2015) (Scalia, J.,

dissenting) (describing the dormant Commerce Clause as "a judge-invented rule under which judges
may set aside state laws that they think impose too much of a burden upon interstate commerce");

Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545 U.S. 429, 439 (2005) (Scalia, J., con-
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Limbach opinion-invalidating a statute that was facially and intentionally discriminatory, an easy target for invalidation-he weakened the
doctrine even while applying it. 221 In a crucial switch, he expressly identified the core function of the dormant Commerce Clause as prohibiting
intentional protectionism, emphasizing that it "prohibits economic protectionism-that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors."2 22 Here was a
crisp articulation of the core of the "new" dormant Commerce Clause, in
terms that closely echoed Making Sense. The Limbach formulation immediately stuck, and is frequently quoted.223 Intention now occupied
center stage.
Subsequent cases confirmed Limbach's location of the doctrine's
new center. In 1994's C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown,224
Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that "[t]he central rationale for the
rule against discrimination is to prohibit state or municipal laws whose
object is local economic protectionism." 225 The same year, in West Lynn
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy226-a case that might have been analytically
close, involving a subsidy to local dairy farmers (almost certainly lawful
under the Supreme Court's subsidy jurisprudence 22 7 ) funded by a tax on
all milk dealers (also almost certainly lawful because nondiscriminatory)-the Court condemned the measure, emphasizing that
protectionism was the "avowed purpose" of the law, and the "motive
behind" it.228

Rhetorical seeds eventually bear decisional fruit, and it would not
be long before the focus on intention began very clearly to dictate outcomes. The implications of the new approach became clear in 1997 when
the Court examined a case of facial discrimination in General Motors
Corp. v. Tracy. 229 In that case, Ohio had created a tax exemption for any
entity that qualified as a "natural gas company"-but only local distribu-

curring) (criticizing the Court's "wardrobe of ever-changing negative Commerce Clause fashions");

Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 674-75 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring)
("[A]s I have explained elsewhere, the negative Commerce Clause, having no foundation in the text
of the Constitution and not lending itself to judicial application except in the invalidation of facially
discriminatory action, should not be extended beyond such action and nondiscriminatory action of

the precise sort hitherto invalidated."); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 312 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[T]he so-called 'negative' Commerce Clause is an unjustified judicial intervention not to be expanded beyond its existing domain.").

221. Limbach, 486 U.S. at 273.
222.
Id.
223.
See, e.g., Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337-38 (2008) (plurality opinion); W.
Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 192 (1994); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992).
224.
511 U.S. 383 (1994).
225.
Id at 390 (emphasis added).
226.
512 U.S. 186 (1994).
227.
See infra Section III.D.3.
228.
W. Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 194, 196.
229.
519 U.S. 278 (1997).
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tors could qualify. 2 30 The Court noted that these local distributors competed with out-of-state companies for the business of one group of customers (the "noncaptive" market), but that they did not significantly
compete with out-of-state suppliers for the business of another group of
customers (the "captive" market). 23' So the tax exemption facially favored local distributors over out-of-state competitors.
But-stunningly-the Court refused to acknowledge the discrimination. Instead, the Court ascribed "controlling significance" to the existence of the "noncaptive market," in which in-state and out-of-state providers did not compete, and on that basis concluded that the prohibition
was non-discriminatory.232 In language foreshadowing the Court's subsequent approach to burden review, the Court also indicated reluctance to
condemn the measure because "as a Court we lack the expertness and the
institutional resources necessary to predict the effects of judicial intervention invalidating Ohio's tax scheme on the utilities' capacity to serve
this captive market." 233 Indeed, the Court went on, "[T]he Court is institutionally unsuited to gather the facts upon which economic predictions
can be made, and professionally untrained to make them." 234
The Tracy decision was remarkable. Disclaiming any ability to
make economic and social judgments, the Court chose to innovate on its
traditional doctrinal approach because of special characteristics of the
market at issue-characteristics that were distinguished and identified
presumably by reference to the very same political and economic factors
the Court disclaimed any competence to identify. 235 The move was particularly perplexing given that the special characteristics in Tracy appeared to be (1) the fact that heating gas was important and (2) the fact
that the state regulated the sector. 236 These factors are, of course, ubiquitous, and it is certainly not obvious that they necessitated tax discrimination as a solution.237
Tracy demonstrates just how far the rule against discrimination had
receded in cases where the legislature was pursuing something other than
230.
Id. at 285. The limitation to local distributors arose from a decision of the Ohio Supreme
Court interpreting the statute in question.

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id. at 302.
Id. at 303-04.
Id. at 304.
Id. at 308 (citation omitted).
Id. at 303-05.
Id.

237.
The complexity of a system of regulation and taxation might, of course, suggest a need for
caution and deference in the framing of a remedy. But for precisely these reasons, the Court has
always allowed the State to take the lead in framing a remedy in taxing cases without any suggestion
that the complexity of the tax code should make discrimination more acceptable in the tax code than

elsewhere. See Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 176 (1990) ("When we have held
state taxes unconstitutional in the past it has been our practice to abstain from deciding the remedial
effects of such a holding. While the relief provided by the State must be in accord with federal
constitutional requirements . . . we have entrusted state courts with the initial duty of determining
appropriate relief." (citations omitted)).
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a special competitive advantage for its own business. The Court was evidently worried that local companies might not survive interstate competition, and that the security of gas supply might be endangered by judicial
238
intervention.28 But three objections present themselves. First, there is no
suggestion in the opinion that the record before the Court supported the
proposition that a discriminatory tax was actually necessary, either for
the protection of the Ohio local gas companies, or for security of gas
supply to Ohio customers. Second, that very same argument-the need to
preserve local industry from the risks of ruinous interstate competitionhad been rejected countless times by the Court as a defense to dormant
Commerce Clause liability, on the ground that it is fundamentally inconsistent with the core of the doctrine. 23 9 Third, the Court's concerns, based
on its own inability to investigate economic effects or interfere with delicate regulatory balances, seem misplaced in this case, for at least three
reasons: (i) the Court had never previously required an investigation of
economic effects when discrimination was facial, as it was here; (ii) if
the Court felt unable to make reliable judgments about economic or political matters, the creation of ad hoc exceptions to settled doctrinebased on the Court's case-by-case assessment of those very same economic or political issues-seems to reproduce, rather than address, that
difficulty; and (iii) there was no suggestion that the difficulties or complexities in Tracy were significantly greater than those presented by other
cases in which the Court had applied its doctrinal framework. For these
reasons, Tracy can be seen as a watershed dormant Commerce Clause
decision.
If Tracy exemplified the Rehnquist Court's work to weaken the
dormant Commerce Clause, worse was to come under the Roberts Court.
In 2007's United Haulers Association v. Oneida-HerkimerSolid Waste
Management Authority,240 the Court considered a local ordinance that
reserved waste disposal business to a single, publicly owned, local enter241
(The case is primarily of note for announcing a "public enterprise.
prise" or "public entity" exception-discussed below 242-but we focus
here on the discrimination analysis.) The Court stated the basic rule, as
238.
239.

See Tracy, 519 U.S. at 308-10.
See, e.g., W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 205 (1994) ("If we were to

accept these arguments, we would make a virtue of the vice that the rule against discrimination
condemns. Preservation of local industry by protecting it from the rigors of interstate competition is
the hallmark of the economic protectionism that the Commerce Clause prohibits."); Bacchus Imps.,

Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 272-73 (1984) ("If we were to accept [the promotion of local industry as
a] justification, we would have little occasion ever to find a statute unconstitutionally discriminato-

ry."); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 545 (1949); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig,
Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935) ("Let such an exception be admitted, and all that a state will have to
do in times of stress and strain is to say that its farmers and merchants and workmen must be protected against competition from without, lest they go upon the poor relief lists or perish altogether.
To give entrance to that excuse would be to invite a speedy end of our national solidarity.").

240.
241.
242.

550 U.S. 330 (2007).
Id. at 336-37.
See infra Section III.D.2.
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was by then usual, in terms of discriminatory purpose.243 But what followed was a remarkable sleight of hand.
A careful reader of the Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence up to 2007 would probably hold the view that state regulations
motivated by protectionist purpose raise constitutional concerns because
protectionist distortions of the internal free market are the problem at
which the Commerce Clause is aimed. In other words, the purpose to
distort competition is objectionable precisely because the effectdistortion of competition-is constitutionally proscribed. But the United
Haulers Court turned this basic proposition around, stating that "when a
law favors in-state business over out-of-state competition, rigorous scrutiny is appropriate because the law is often the product of simple economic protectionism." 2 4 In other words, the Court reasoned, protectionist effect triggers constitutional scrutiny because it suggests a protectionist purpose. The tail of purpose was now cheerfully wagging the dog of
effects. And this idea carried the implicit corollary that if a protectionist
purpose was not present, then even a clear protectionist effect would be
no cause for alarm.
Sure enough, the next stage of the analysis followed straight from
this topsy-turvy premise. The category of laws that the Court believed
were at issue in United Haulers-"[1]awsfavoring local government"were untroubling because, "by contrast [with most protectionist regulation, they] may be directed toward any number of legitimate goals unrelated to protectionism." 245 Thus, even if laws do have a protectionist effect, there is no dormant Commerce Clause concern when they might not
have a protectionist purpose. Having deftly set the cart before the horse
in this way, the Court did not miss a further opportunity to harvest the
fruit of Tracy by locating yet another category of extra-special deference
to state regulation in order to bolster its conclusion. Just as natural gas
was special in Tracy, so too waste disposal would get special deference
in United Haulers because it "is both typically and traditionally a local
government function." 24 The Court completed its analysis by pointing
out that the harm from any lost competition fell on the politically empowered voters of the regulating state: an argument that applies to virtually every dormant Commerce Clause case.247 Yet again the Court disUnited Haulers, 550 U.S. at 338 ("Discriminatory laws motivated by 'simple economic
243.
protectionism' are subject to a 'virtually per se rule of invalidity . . . .' (emphasis added) (quoting

City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978))). The City of Philadelphiadecision
itself actually said "where simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually
per se rule of invalidity has been erected," which is hardly the same thing. City ofPhiladelphia,437

U.S. at 624 (emphasis added).
244.

United Haulers,550 U.S. at 343 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).

245.

Id. (emphasis added).

Id at 344 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
246.
Id. at 343-45. Needless to say, every dormant Commerce Clause case-indeed, every
247.
constitutional challenge to a State measure-involves an attempt to secure a victory the challenger
could not obtain through the political process. See supra note 30 and accompanying text; see also W.
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claimed economic and political expertise while relying on its own economic and political analysis to justify special treatment in an individual
case.
The United Haulers Court wrapped up, and drove home its emphasis on subjective purpose, with a truly remarkable account of burden review (i.e., the deferential scrutiny applicable to all measures, including
non-discriminatory ones). The Court described this highly deferential
standard of review as the appropriate metric-not just for measures that
were non-discriminatory-but for laws that were "directed to legitimate
local concerns, with effects upon interstate commerce that are only incidental." 248 The strong rule against discrimination now seemed to be reserved only for those forms of discrimination that were not subjectively
"directed to legitimate local concerns." 249 A fine dissent written by Justice Alito, and joined by Justices Stevens and Kennedy, vigorously attacked the opinion, to no avail. 250

United Haulers was no aberration. The Court went out of its way to
reaffirm it in the very next landmark dormant Commerce Clause decision: Department of Revenue v. Davis251 in 2008. In that case, the Court
considered Kentucky's decision to immunize income from its own bonds
from taxation while denying such an exemption to bonds of other
states.252 A case of clear facial discrimination in favor of in-state interests, one would think. But the Court hammered home the now-familiar
language of Justice Scalia's Limbach formulation-"the dormant Commerce Clause is driven by concern about . .. regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state
competitors253 -and made a point of repeating the cart-before-horse
move from United Haulers.254 The Court concluded that the dormant
Commerce Clause had not been offended, relying on yet another "special" exemption that we will discuss below. 255 Just as in United Haulers,
and in Tracy before that, a clear example of facial discrimination was not
even put to a test of justification.

Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 215 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("Analysis of
interest group participation in the political process may serve many useful purposes, but serving as a
basis for interpreting the dormant Commerce Clause is not one of them.").

248. UnitedHaulers, 550 U.S. at 343, 346 (emphasis added) (quoting City ofPhiladelphia,437
U.S. at 624).
249.
Id. (quoting City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 624). Note that this holding at last assigned
meaning to the comment in City of Philadelphiathat burden review was the appropriate standard
outside a core zone of"patent" discrimination. See City ofPhiladelphia,437 U.S. at 624.

250.

United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 357-66 (Alito, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority's

application based on the distinction between public and private entities).

251.
252.

553 U.S. 328 (2008) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 333-34.

253.

Id. at 337-38 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).

254.
255.

Id. at 341.
See infra Section III.D.L
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But the historic low in the discrimination jurisprudence of the Court
was yet to come. It arrived in 2013 with the decision in McBurney v.
Young,256 which is at the time of writing the Court's most recent substantive statement on the doctrine in a non-tax case. 2 57 Virginia's FOIA statute provided access to public documents and records, materials that constitute a crucial competitive input for companies engaged in the business
of obtaining such records and providing them to consumers.258 But the
statute limited access to such materials to Virginia citizens only. 259 The
out-of-state proprietor of one such records company was denied access
on the basis that he was not a Virginia citizen, and along with others, he
challenged the limitation under the dormant Commerce Clause.260
This was not merely discrimination: it was facial discrimination
placing out-of-staters at a significant competitive disadvantage. But there
was obviously no "protectionist purpose" at work-of course, the Virginia FOIA statute was not drafted with the intention of imposing a competitive disadvantage on out-of-state suppliers in the public-records business.
So by now the outcome should have been clear. The Court began by emphasizing that intentional discrimination was the root of Commerce
Clause evil. 2 6 1 But rather than decide the case on that basis, the Court
was to outdo itself: holding, remarkably, that Virginia's FOIA law was
not suitable for review under the dormant Commerce Clause at all.262 The
law in question
neither "regulates" nor "burdens" interstate commerce; rather, it
merely provides a service to local citizens that would not otherwise
be available at all. . . . This case is thus most properly brought under
the Privileges and Immunities Clause: It quite literally poses the
question whether Virginia can deny out-of-state citizens a benefit that
it has conferred on its own citizens.263
This is a staggering conclusion for two reasons. First, it is well established that an "overlap" between the dormant Commerce Clause claim
and a potential Privileges and Immunities Clause claim is not remotely
harmful to either claim. The Court has on more than one occasion applied both provisions to state regulation, using quite separate analytical
frameworks, reflecting the fact that the two Clauses are fundamentally
concerned with different things and subject to radically different limita-

256.

133 S. Ct. 1709 (2013).

257.
The "non-tax" caveat refers to Comptrollerof Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015),
which is not clearly a discrimination case but is discussed in the next subsection.

258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

McBurney, 133 S. Ct. at 1713.
See id. at 1714.
Id.
Id. at 1719-20.
See id. at 1720.
Id.
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tions of scope. 264 The dormant Commerce Clause is concerned with distortions of economic competition; the Privileges and Immunities Clause
is concerned with denial of equal treatment to natural persons with respect to a set of "fundamental rights." It is beyond dispute that a measure
can come out one way under the dormant Commerce Clause and another
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause,265 the Equal Protection
Clause,266 or for that matter, the Due Process Clause.267 Second, it is absurdly inconsistent on the facts of the case. The Court held in the very
same opinion that the right to public records fell outside the Privileges
and Immunities Clause. 2 8 The fact that it would be possible to frame a
claim unsuccessfully under one provision of the Constitution hardly
weakens, let alone invalidates, an otherwise meritorious constitutional
claim under another provision.
The Court finally commented that, even if the dormant Commerce
Clause were applied to the Virginia FOIA law, a special exception-the
market participant doctrine-would apply: a conclusion discussed below. 269 The Court's determination to save this "innocent" statute could
hardly have been clearer.
Finally, the Court's most recent dormant Commerce Clause decision-Comptroller of Treasury v. Wynne 270-iS worth brief comment.
264.

See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 221-22

(1984) ("Camden may, without fear of violating the Commerce Clause, pressure private employers
engaged in public works projects funded in whole or in part by the city to hire city residents. But that
same exercise of power . . . may be called to account under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.");
id. at 220 ("The two Clauses have different aims and set different standards for state conduct."); see

also White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Emp'rs, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 213-15 (1983) (reaching opposite result under the dormant Commerce Clause).

265.

See, e.g., United Bldg., 465 U.S. at 219-21 (declining to immunize under the Privileges

and Immunities Clause a measure virtually identical to one authorized the previous year under the
dormant Commerce Clause, on the ground that "[t]he two Clauses have different aims and set different standards for state conduct").

266.

See, e.g., Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 345-46 (1996) ("While we continue to

measure the equal protection of economic legislation by a rational basis test [under the Equal Protection Clause], we now understand the dormant Commerce Clause to require justifications for discriminatory restrictions on commerce [to] pass the strictest scrutiny. Hence, while cases like Kidd and
Darnell [which uphold State taxing rules] may still be authorities under the Equal Protection Clause,
they are no longer good law under the Commerce Clause." (internal quotation marks omitted) (cita-

tions omitted)); Metro. Life Ins. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 881 (1985) (holding measure unlawful under
the Equal Protection Clause even though it was immunized from dormant Commerce Clause analysis and stating: "[T]he State's view ignores the differences between Commerce Clause and equal
protection analysis and the consequent different purposes those two constitutional provisions

serve."); cf W. & S. Life Ins. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 656-57 (1981) (applying
Equal Protection Clause to a measure that was immune from Commerce Clause challenge).

267.

See, e.g., Comptroller of Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1798 (2015) ("[W]hile a

State may, consistent with the Due Process Clause, have the authority to tax a particular taxpayer,
imposition of the tax may nonetheless violate the Commerce Clause." (quoting Quill Corp. v. North

Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 305 (1992))); Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1,
15-16 (1898) (invalidating a statute under the Commerce Clause although the same statute had
previously been held lawful under the Fourteenth Amendment).

268.
269.
270.

McBurney, 133 S. Ct. at 1717-18.
See infra Section III.D.l.
135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015).
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Under Maryland's taxing rules, residents paid both a state income tax
and a county income tax on all their income, while nonresidents paid the
state income tax on income derived in Maryland plus a "special nonresident tax" as a substitute for the county tax.27 For residents, taxable income included income that had been earned in other states, but, to the
extent that such out-of-state income was also taxed by the other state in
question, the taxpayer was allowed to deduct the tax paid to that other
state from their liability to pay Maryland's state income tax.272 This
avoided "double taxation" of income earned outside the state. But the
problem was that the county income tax included no such offset.273 So a
resident's liability to pay the county tax on any income earned in another
state would be additionalto all the tax, if any, charged on that income by
the other state.274
The taxing rule in Wynne obviously failed the test of internal consistency: that is, the rule that a state tax must be such that, if the tax were
universalized among the states, interstate commerce would not be more
heavily taxed than intrastate commerce. 2 75 The Court's analysis rested
firmly on this ground,276 though the majority did not admit that the
Court's precedents were murky on the issue of whether a state of residency or domicile was required to apportion income at all.277 But there
was no suggestion of protectionist purpose. To some extent, then, this
decision looks at odds with the general narrative I am offering here.
Perhaps Wynne is a wobble on the course that I have described here,
but, if it is, it is a small and likely irrelevant one. Wynne turned on a mechanical application of the internal consistency rule-a specific rule applied in taxation cases with no direct equivalent in non-tax cases. Tax
cases are, doctrinally speaking, a little different, and much more specific: the analysis relies on peculiar heuristics like "fair apportionment" and
"substantial nexus," rather than the more porous tests ("legitimate,"
271.

Id. at 1792 (internal quotation marks omitted).

272.
273.
274.

Id. at 1798.
Id at 1792.
Id

275.
To see why, consider the following. If every State taxed income earned by its residents in
another State at rate X, without granting an offset for income tax paid to that other State, and also
taxed in-State income from nonresidents at rate Y, income derived in-state by State residents would
be subject to burden X, income derived in-state by nonresidents would be subject to burden X+Y,
and income derived out-of-state by State residents would be subject to burden X+Y. The result
would be that interstate commerce bore a heavier burden: the internal consistency test would be

violated. See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 185 (1995); see also Am.
Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545 U.S. 429, 437 (2005); Goldberg v. Sweet,
488 U.S. 252, 261 (1989), abrogatedby Comptroller of Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015);
Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983).
276.
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1803-05.
277.
See id. at 1798-99; J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 311-14 (1938). But see
W. Publ'g Co. v. McColgan, 328 U.S. 823, 823 (1946) (per curiam) (affirming the lower court's
judgment allowing apportionment of income tax by a state of domicile and another state in which

income is earned), affg 166 P.2d 861, 864 (Cal. 1946); Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S.
292, 299-300 (1944).
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278
"clearly excessive,"
and so on) that characterize the non-tax cases.
And the hypothetical universalization analysis applied by the Court under the internal consistency test is not a true discrimination test: in discrimination cases the Court asks whether this law before the Court-not
some hypothetical set of universalized rules-actually differentiates in
form or effect. So I see Wynne as telling us little about the Court's general attitude to discrimination: it is chiefly significant to the extent that it
suggests that the "decline" may be confined to non-tax cases.

For these reasons, Wynne can be bracketed, at least for now. Stepping back a little to review the four horsemen of the dormant Commerce
Clause apocalypse-McBurney, Davis, United Haulers, and Tracy-the
disintegration of the rule against discrimination is clear. Under the
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, in cases without evidence of a subjective
intention to distort competition, the rule against discrimination has collapsed.
C. The Decline ofBurden Review
In recent jurisprudence, the practice of "burden review" of even
non-discriminatory regulation-commonly known since 1970 as the
"Pike test," and turning on whether the regulatory burden on interstate
commerce is "unreasonable"-has dwindled dramatically. I want to start
by showing how deeply and broadly the roots of burden review reach in
the history of the dormant Commerce Clause, and then show how far the
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have gone in pulling them up. 279
1. The Tradition of Burden Review
Burden review dates from the early years of the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine. Non-discriminatory rules were at issue in a number of
the key early cases, including Willson, Cooley, and others, with no indication from the Court that discrimination was the limit of the preclusive
reach of the dormant Commerce Clause.280 Indeed, Willson itself set the
theme for much of what was to follow, with its gnomic indication that
the legality of a state measure was to be analyzed in light of "all the cir-

278.
Indeed, Regan himself left taxing cases outside the scope of his article and his claims.
Regan, supra note 2, at 1099.
279.
Arguably included in this category, but not discussed here, is what Brannon Denning has
identified as the death of the rule against extraterritorial State regulation. Denning, supranote 100, at
1006 ("[Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine] extraterritoriality is, for all intents and purposes,

dead.").
280.
Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851), abrogatedby Okla. Tax
Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1995); Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27
U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829). But see Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123, 140 (1868)
.

("There is no attempt to discriminate injuriously against the products of other States or the rights of
their citizens, and the case is not, therefore, an attempt to fetter commerce among the States . .

(emphasis added)).
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cumstances of the case." 281 And the Court actually struck down a nondiscriminatory measure under the Commerce Clause at least as early as
1867: a five dollar port charge that applied to in-state and out-of-state
entities and commerce alike in Southern Steamship Co. of New Orleans
v. Portwardens.282 It is also worth noting that the second "dormant
Commerce Clause case" ever decided by the Court, Brown, concerned a
discriminatory regulation that was treated by the Court as a nondiscriminatory one, and in that case Chief Justice Marshall intimated that
state laws could be constitutionally troubling if they "affect[ed] materially the purpose for which [the commerce] power was given" to the federal
Congress.283 He went on to emphasize that "[w]e cannot admit, that
[State taxing power] may be used so as to obstruct or defeat the power to
regulate commerce."284 That is the language of burden review, right at
the birth of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. Moreover, it is far
from an anomaly.
It is impossible not to read much of the Court's analysis in a great
many of its earlier cases as amounting to or motivated by burden review:
that is, a concern with the overall reasonableness of the burden on commerce in light of the measure's benefits. To be clear, I do not claim that
the Court has a long history of aggressively or casually invalidating state
laws based on a de novo review of their wisdom. Nor do I claim that the
Court has been consistent or clear in its adjudicative practice, in this any
more than in any other aspect of its dormant Commerce Clause (or indeed its constitutional) jurisprudence. My purpose is just to point out that
burden review-or reasonableness review, if you prefer-has for a very
long time been part of the dormant Commerce Clause toolkit, contrary to
the views of those like Donald Regan and Louis Henkin who perceive
balancing analysis as a recent development in dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence.285
I think there are two good ways to develop this point. The first is to
show that a rule against unreasonable burden is consistent with the language of the Court's decisions; the second is to show that the logic of
burden review helps to explain what would otherwise be puzzling outcomes in the Court's adjudicative practice. In service of the first approach, I offer evidence of considerable support for burden review in the
281.

Willson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 252. Indeed, at least one judge familiar with the views of Chief

Justice Marshall later understood the decision in Willson to have turned on the extent of the burden

imposed by the State in that case. See The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 398 (1849)
(McLean, J.) ("The chief justice [in Willson] was speaking of a creek which falls into the Delaware,
and admitted in the pleadings to be navigable, but ofso limited an extent that it might well be doubted whether the general regulation of commerce could apply to it." (emphasis added)).

282.
283.
284.

73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 31, 32 (1867).
Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 449 (1827).
Id. at 448.

285.

See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: ConstitutionalBalancing, 78 COLUM. L.

REV. 1022, 1038 (1978) (arguing that the pre-1937 cases did not require balancing); Regan, supra
note 2, at 1109.
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Court's jurisprudence before Pike in the following footnote.28 Again, I
make no claim that this practice of burden review was con286.

See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443, 448 (1960)

(measure not "unduly burdensome"); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 529-30
(1959) (non-discriminatory measures may create an "unconstitutional burden"); Buck v. California,
343 U.S. 99, 103 (1952) (permit and fee requirement not an "unreasonable burden"); Freeman v.

Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946) ("A State is... precluded from taking any [non-discriminatory]
action which may fairly be deemed to have the effect of impeding the free flow of trade between

States."), overruled by Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1995); Morgan v.
Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 386 (1946) (court must "balance . .

the exercise of the local police power

and the need for national uniformity"); Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 425 (1946)
(States may not impose "undue or discriminatory" burdens); California v. Thonipson, 313 U.S. 109,
113-14 (1941) (State measure lawful if it "neither discriminates against nor substantially obstructs"

commerce); Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg Farm Prods., 306 U.S. 346, 352 (1939) (court must
"weigh[] the nature of the respondent's activities, and the propriety of local regulation"); Bourjois,

Inc. v. Chapman, 301 U.S. 183, 187-88 (1937) (standard is "actual undue burden"); Mintz v. Bald-

win, 289 U.S. 346, 349-50 (1933) (measure does not "so unnecessarily burden[] interstate transportation as to contravene the commerce clause"); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 315 (1925) (State
measures lawful where the "indirect burden imposed on interstate commerce is not unreasonable");

Mich. Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570, 577 (1925) (State measures may not "pass beyond
the bounds of what is reasonable and suitable"); Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427, 435
(1919) (measure lawful when "reasonable and nondiscriminatory"); Port Richmond & Bergen Point

Ferry Co. v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 234 U.S. 317, 331 (1914) (distinguishing "burdensome
exactions" from "reasonable charges"); Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Georgia, 234 U.S. 280, 291
(1914) (State measures "must not be arbitrary, or pass beyond the limits of a fair judgment as to

what the exigency demands"); Barrett v. City of New York, 232 U.S. 14, 31 (1914) (measure lawful
absent "unreasonable demands" on business or applicable federal law); id at 33 ("[W]hen the
movement of interstate traffic is involved, [regulations] should be entirely reasonable and should not
arbitrarily restrict the facilities upon which it must depend."); Simpson v. Shepard (The Minnesota

Rate Cases), 230 U.S. 352, 408, 410 (1913) ("[State legislation] may extend incidentally to the
operations of the carrier in the conduct of interstate business, provided it does not subject that business to unreasonable demands, and is not opposed to Federal legislation."); Standard Stock Food Co.
v. Wright, 225 U.S. 540, 549 (1912) (measure was "not an unreasonable one"); Savage v. Jones, 225
U.S. 501, 525 (1912) (measure lawful when, among other things, it "has real relation to the suitable
protection of the people of the state, and is reasonable in its requirements"); West v. Kan. Nat. Gas
Co., 221 U.S. 229, 262 (1911) (no State may "unreasonably burden" interstate commerce); Engel v.

O'Malley, 219 U.S. 128, 138 (1911) (noting that the threshold of legality "is a question of more or
less.. . . The question is whether the state law creates a direct burden upon what it is for Congress to
control, and the facts of the specific case must be weighed"); Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Larabee Flour

Mills Co., 211 U.S. 612, 622-24 (1909) ("In none of these cases [in which State regulations were

&

upheld] was it thought that the regulations were unreasonable, or operated in any just sense as a
restriction upon interstate commerce."); Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 152 (1902) (State measure
did not "unduly burden[]" interstate commerce where "it does not appear otherwise than that the
statute can be obeyed without serious embarrassment or unreasonable cost"); Smith v. St. Louis

Sw. Ry. Co., 181 U.S. 248, 255 (1901) (test of legality is "whether the police power of the state has
been exerted beyond its province .. . and to an extent beyond what is necessary" (emphasis omitted)); id. at 258 ("It is the character of the circumstances which gives or takes from a law or regula-

tion of quarantine a legal quality."); Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1898)
(measure unlawful where overbroad); N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co. v. New York, 165 U.S.
628, 631 (1897) (States retained authority "to establish such reasonable regulations as were appropriate for the protection of the health, the lives, and the safety of their people"); id at 632-33 ("[A]
state [may] make such reasonable regulations for the safety of passengers on interstate trains as in its
judgment, all things considered, is appropriate and effective."); Gladson v. Minnesota, 166 U.S. 427,
431 (1897) (State measure lawful where burden involved a "few minutes" and a "trifling expense,"
as it was a "reasonable exercise of the police power of the state"); W. Union Tel. Co. v. James, 162
U.S. 650, 662 (1896) (measure lawful where "we cannot say that it is so unreasonable as to be outside of and beyond the jurisdiction of the state to enact"); Pittsburg & S. Coal Co. v. Louisiana, 156

U.S. 590, 598 (1895) ("[The challenged regulations] may in some cases in a slight degree affect
commerce, but not in such an extent or sense as to be properly designated as regulations of commerce."); Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78, 82-83 (1891) (State measure was not automatically
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sistent: everyone knows that the Court's Commerce Clause cases are
anything but that. And, of course, some cases clearly reject the language
and the logic of burden review.287 But it is impossible to read through the
Court's innumerable dormant Commerce Clause adjudications without
being struck by the length and clarity of burden review's lineage. I include the outrageous footnote in order to demolish the notion that burden
review of non-discriminatory regulations is an innovation in the jurisprudence of the dormant Commerce Clause, or a creature of any particular
Court, or any particular era.
Separately, I also claim that there are ample grounds on which to
conclude that the logic of burden review explains knots of contradiction
in the Court's application of the formalistic tests that characterized its
earlier jurisprudence. (This resonates with the view of Justice Stone, architect of the Traditional Framework. 288) One such knot of cases deals
with local-service requirements for railroads: that is, state regulations
providing that railroad companies engaged in interstate transportation
must provide a certain level of service to towns and cities within the
state's own territory. If read at face value, these cases are all over the
map. If the distinction between legality and illegality is "directness" of
burden, how could a law requiring that "a railroad company whose road
is operated within the state shall cause three each way of its regular trains
carrying passengers, if so many are run daily, Sundays excepted, to stop
at any station, city, or village of 3,000 inhabitants for a time sufficient to
receive and let off passengers" be lawful in 1899,289 and a law that
lawful "simply because the statute imposing it applies alike to the people of all the states, including
the people of the state enacting such statute"); Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 14 U.S. 196,
217 (1885) ("Reasonable charges for the use of property, either on water or land, are not an interence
[sic] with the freedom of transportation between the states, secured under the commercial power of

congress."); R.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 472 (1877) ("[A State] may not interfere with transportation into or through the State, beyond what is absolutely necessary for its self-protection. It may
not, under the cover of exerting its police powers, substantially prohibit or burden either foreign or
inter-state commerce."); id. at 473 ("[Illinois] courts have refused to inquire whether the prohibition
did not extend beyond the danger to be apprehended, and whether, therefore, the statutes were not
something more than exertions of police power. That inquiry, they have said, was for the legislature
and not for the courts. With this we cannot concur."); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418,
428-29 (1870) (States may enact "reasonable regulations" for tax collection); Hinson v. Lott, 75-

U.S. (8 Wall.) 148, 151 (1868) ("[A] tax which so seriously affects the interchange of commodities
between the States as to essentially impede or seriously interfere with it, is a regulation of com-

merce."); Conway v. Taylor's Ex'r, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 603, 634 (1861) ("[States] may pass laws so
infringing the commercial power of the nation that it would be the duty of this court to annul or
control them. The function is one of extreme delicacy, and only to be performed where the infraction
is clear." (citation omitted)).

287.
See, e.g., S.C. State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 189 (1938); Shafer
v. Farmers' Grain Co. of Embden, 268 U.S. 189, 202 (1925); In re State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. 232,
276 (1872), abrogatedby Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1995); Veazie
v. Moor, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 568, 574 (1852); The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 404
(1849).
Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927) (Stone, J., dissenting) (noting that
288.
earlier cases turned on "consideration of all the facts and circumstances, such as the nature of the
regulation, its function, the character of the business involved and the actual effect on the flow of
commerce"), overruled on othergrounds by California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 114-15 (1941).

289.

Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Ohio ex rel. Lawrence, 173 U.S. 285, 301 (1899).
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"[e]very railroad corporation shall cause its passenger trains to stop upon ... arrival at each station advertised .. . as a place of receiving and
discharging passengers upon and from such trains, a sufficient length of
time to receive and let off such passengers with safety" be unlawful in
1900?290
But the picture becomes clearer with the insight that burden analysis, reasonableness analysis, was doing much of the work in these cases.
In Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co. v. Ohio ex rel. Lawrence,291 the Court was perfectly clear about it: "the reasonableness or
unreasonableness of a state enactment is always an element in the general inquiry by the court whether such legislation encroaches upon national authority, or is to be deemed a legitimate exertion of the power of
the state. ...
The Court concluded that the law, "so far from being
unreasonable, will greatly subserve the public convenience."293 Likewise,
in Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co. v. Illinois ex
rel. Jett,294 the Court observed that "[s]everal acts in pari materia with
the one under consideration have been before this court, and have been
approved or disapproved as they have seemed reasonable or unreasonable, or bore more or less heavily upon the power of railways to regulate
their trains in the respective and sometimes conflicting interests of local
and through traffic."2 95 And that same principle was to drive the conclusion: "The demurrer to the answer admits that the railway company [already] furnishes a sufficient number of regularpassenger trains (four
each way a day), to accommodate all the local and through business
along the line of the road, and that all of such trains stop at Hillsboro .. . and if compelled to stop at county seats the company will be compelled to abandon the train, to the great damage of the traveling public
and to the railway company." 296 And the very same approach was taken
in Houston & Texas Central Railroad Co. v. Mayes, 297 in which the
Court observed that "[t]he exact limit of lawful legislation upon this subject cannot, in the nature of things, be defined. It can only be illustrated
from decided cases, by applying the principles therein enunciated, determining from these whether, in the particularcase, the rule be reasonable or otherwise."298

290.
(1900).
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

Cleveland, Cinncinati, Chi., & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Illinoit ex rel. Jett, 177 U.S. 514, 515
173 U.S. 285 (1899).
Id. at 301 (emphasis added).
Id.
177 U.S. 514 (1900).
Id. at 518 (emphasis added).
Id. at 521 (emphasis added).
201 U.S. 321 (1906).
Id. at 328 (emphasis added).
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I could, but will not, go on. 29 9 These cases strongly suggest that the
logic of burden review motivated the outcome of these decisions. And a
similar approach seems to unlock-at least to a significant extent-other
knots of case law that make little sense on their formalist face. Let us
take just two further examples, rather more briefly, to make the point.
First, consider the "arrival requirements" cases: the apparently contradictory cases reviewing state regulations applicable to arriving vessels and
their passengers. Why, for example, was New York forbidden to impose
a $1.50 capitation tax upon boat passengers in Henderson v. Mayor of
New York, 300 and California forbidden to demand a bond for passengers'
good behavior in Chy Lung v. Freeman,301 while New York was permitted to impose a $75 penalty per passenger for failure to produce a manifest in Mayor of New York v. Miln?302 Can it really have been that the
imposition of a burden on each arriving passenger was a regulation of
interstate commerce, "direct" or otherwise, in Henderson and Chy Lung
but not in Miln? Of course not. The inconsistency recedes when we set
the formalistic language of the opinions aside and recognize that a requirement to provide a list is simply a lighter and more reasonable measure in light of its minimal burden on the business in question and the
available grounds of public interest; an automatic per-capita charge or an
onerous bond requirement for carrying passengers is less so.30 3
Second, consider the long line of cases dealing with vehicle regulation: requirements and specifications pertaining to equipment, crews,
dimensions, and so on. At first glance these cases seem hopelessly jumbled. A state may require trains to use a certain kind of headlight, 304 may
require cabooses on trains, 305 and may forbid them from using a particular kind of furnace,306 but may not require trucks to use a certain kind of
mudguard.3 07 A state may require that trains travel with a minimum complement of staff,30 8 but it may not require that passengers be seated in
segregated or unsegregated arrangements. 3 It may prohibit cars from
299.
See, e.g., Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Wharton, 207 U.S. 328, 334-35 (1907); Miss. R.R.
Comm'n v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 203 U.S. 335, 346-47 (1906).
300.
92 U.S. 259, 263 (1875); see also The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 572 (1849)
(capitation tax unlawful).

301.
302.

92 U.S. 275, 281 (1875).
36 U.S. (II Pet.) 102, 104-105, 107 (1837).

303.
1 lay no emphasis here on the language of these opinions, which are often highly formalistic. I am concerned solely with outcomes.

304.
Vandalia R.R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 242 U.S. 255, 259-60 (1916); Atl. Coast Line
R.R. Co. v. Georgia, 234 U.S. 280, 293-94 (1914).
305.
Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis v. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1943).
306.
N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co. v. New York, 165 U.S. 628, 631 (1897).
307.
Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 530 (1959).
308.
Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 393
U.S. 129, 144 (1968); Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Norwood, 283 U.S. 249, 256 (1931); St. Louis, Iron
Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, 240 U.S. 518, 520-21 (1916); Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R.
Co. v. Arkansas, 219 U.S. 453, 466 (1911).
309.
Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 386 (1946); Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U.S. 485, 490 (1877).
But see Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kentucky, 179 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1900); Plessy v. Ferguson,
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being carried over transporter cabs, 31 0 but may not prohibit trucks or
trains beyond a certain length.311 Were the permitted rules really "indirect" regulations, but the proscribed ones "direct" regulations, in any
meaningful sense?
Again, I think not. I see no sensible way to organize the outcomes in
these cases that is not sensitive to burden, and specifically to the relationship between burden and benefit. In the mudguard case, for example, a
serious burden was threatened:
[I]f a trailer is to be operated in both States, mudguards would have
to be interchanged, causing a significant delay in an operation where
prompt movement may be of the essence. It was found that from two
to four hours of labor are required to install or remove a contour
mudguard.

312

Likewise, approving the headlamp law in Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Georgia,313 it emphasized that "[t]he requirements of a
state . . . must not ... pass beyond the limits of a fair judgment as to
what the exigency demands. ...
Likewise, in Morgan v. Virginia,
reviewing a segregation law, the Court emphasized "the degree of state
legislation's interference with . . . commerce,"316 and that the analysis
was "a matter of balance between the exercise of the local police power
and the need for national uniformity." 317
This approach, in one form or another, pervades the Court's jurisprudence. Analysis of whether a subject "requires" a uniform national
standard-a test inaugurated in Cooley and frequently invoked thereafter--often seems to be a euphemism for burden review, rooted in a practical economic assessment of the consequences of unilateral state regulation. 1 8 Language of "requirement" and "necessity" simply obscure what
is going on: review for unreasonable burden.

163 U.S. 537, 548 (1896) (sustaining segregation requirement for intrastate railroad travel), over-

ruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Louisville, New Orleans & Tex. Ry. Co. v.
Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587, 591-92 (1890).
310.
Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598, 617 (1940).
311.
Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662, 677-79 (1981) (plurality
opinion); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 447-48 (1978); S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 783-84 (1945).
312.
Bibb, 359 U.S. at 527.
313.
234 U.S. 280 (1914).
314.
Id. at 291.
315.
328 U.S. 373 (1946).
316.
Id. at 380.
317.
Id. at 386.
318.
See Denning, supra note 2, at 459 ("[E]vidence that burdens on interstate commerce
clearly outweighed local benefits suggested that it was a national problem to be regulated by Congress, if at all."). But see Aleinikoff, supra note 169, at 952 ("[S]ome might say that Lochner and
many constitutional decisions of the nineteenth century were based on implicit, undisclosed balances. While this claim cannot be disproved, I think it is quite unlikely to be correct.").
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2. The Retreat from Burden Review
Having established the long history of burden review in the Court's
body of precedent and practice, we now turn to its erosion under the
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts. To be sure, burden review remains part of
the Court's rhetorical toolkit, linked these days to the 1970 Pike decision, 319 and commentators often express the view that this test remains
good law. 320 But the reality is different.
Burden review was still alive and well as recently as 1982, when it
played a key role in Edgar.3 2 1 The case concerned the Illinois Business
Take-Over Act, which applied to any takeover tender offer for the shares
of
[A] corporation or other issuer of securities of which shareholders located in Illinois own 10% of the class of equity securities subject to
the offer, or for which any two of the following three conditions are
met: the corporation has its principal executive office in Illinois, is
organized under the laws of Illinois, or has at least 10% of its stated
capital and paid-in surplus represented within the State.322
Upon such tender offers the Act imposed a twenty-day waiting period, during which the Illinois Secretary of State was empowered to
block the offer if the offer was "inequitable or would work or tend to
work a fraud or deceit upon the offerees."323 This amounted to a veto on
interstate takeovers: undertaking burden review, the Court held that it
was unreasonable and invalidated it. The Court reaffirmed that "even
when a state statute regulates interstate commerce indirectly, the burden
imposed on that commerce must not be excessive in relation to the local
interests served by the statute." 324 Rejecting the state's public-purpose
defense, and noting that the Act purported to give Illinois the power to
block "nationwide" tender offers, the Court responded that Illinois could
assert no interest in protecting citizens of other states from undesirable
tender offers; moreover, the measure added little benefit in light of existing law.325 As such, the balance between benefits and burdens was unreasonable and the law was invalidated.326
319.
See, e.g., Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338-39 (2008) (plurality opinion);
United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 346 (2007)
(plurality opinion); Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545 U.S. 429, 433
(2005).
320.

See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism:A General

Theory ofArticle 1, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REv. 115, 167 (2010) ("The dormant Commerce Clause
almost always prohibits states from . . . placing an undue burden on the interstate movement of
goods and services.").

321.
322.

Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640 (1982) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 627.

323.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).

324.
325.
326.

Id. at 643 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
Id. at 644-46.
Id. at 646.
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A similar, but more narrowly tailored, measure came before the
Court just five years later: Indiana's anti-takeover statute, challenged in
CTS Corp.327 The Indiana statute was similar to Illinois's, but it applied
only to corporations with a stronger link to the regulating state than Illinois had required in Edgar.32 8 The Court emphasized-citing Donald
Regan, whose Making Sense article had just been published-that the
"principal objects" of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine were discriminatory state regulations, unlike the non-discriminatory Indiana statute. 329 Then the Court turned to the central question of whether the Act's
capacity to hinder tender offers-surely the essence of its burden on interstate commerce-raised a constitutional difficulty. The Court concluded that it did not. The Act made a significant contribution to protecting shareholders of Indiana corporations,
and its limitation to corporations with a strong Indiana link meant that its commercial burdens were
less than those imposed by the law at issue in Edgar.331 The Act survived.
The CTS Corp. Court also intimated that judicial abstention was
particularly appropriate because "[tihe very commodity that is traded in
the securities market is one whose characteristics are defined by state
law" 332 ; the state has a long-settled role as an "overseer of corporate gov-

ernance" 333; and "state regulation of corporate governance is regulation
of entities whose very existence and attributes are a product of state
law." 3 34 We recognize here the kind of deferential special pleading that
was to re-appear in Tracy in 1997, as discussed above.335 Concurring,
Justice Scalia made a point of commending the work of Donald Regan. 33 6
He wrote:
One commentator [Regan] has suggested that, at least much of the
time, we do not in fact mean what we say when we declare that statutes which neither discriminate against commerce nor present a
threat of multiple and inconsistent burdens might nonetheless be un-

327.

CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 72-73 (1987).

328.

Compare id at 73 (noting that the act applies only to businesses incorporated in Indiana),

with Edgar, 457 U.S. at 626-27 (noting that the act applies to any takeover offer for shares of a
target company, which includes any corporation where any two of the three conditions are met: the
principal executive office is in Illinois, it is incorporated in Illinois, or has at least 10% of its capital
and paid-in surplus represented within Illinois).
329.
CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 87.
330.
Id. at 91.
331.
Id. at 93-94.
332.
Id. at 94.
333.
Id. at 91.
334. Id. at 89.
335.
See supra text accompanying notes 230-39 (discussing Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519
U.S. 278 (1997)).
336.
CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 95 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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constitutional under a "balancing" test. If he is not correct, he ought
to be. 337

CTS Corp. marked a sea change. In the almost thirty years since this
decision, the Court has not struck down a single statute under the
dormant Commerce Clause on grounds of burden.
But while burden review was to show no further teeth after Edgar,
no serious effort was made to actually kill it until the advent of the Roberts Court. The occasion for the first decisive step was UnitedHaulers, a
case in which-as noted above-an ordinance enacted by two counties
had completely reserved the local waste processing business to a company that was publicly owned: all other businesses were excluded from
competition. 338 The counties effectively monopolized the market by ordinance and denied it to all competitors, foreign and domestic. The Court
held, applying mysterious logic discussed below,339 that the measure
should be analyzed as a non-discriminatory regulation.
But our concern here is with the fact that the United Haulers Court
made short work of burden review. The Court (somewhat uncritically)
accepted the state's view that the measure promoted revenue generation
(because, as a publicly-owned monopolist, the public entity generated
money for the state); it also "create[d] enhanced incentives for recycling
and proper disposal of. . . waste" and "markedly increased [the counties'] ability to enforce recycling laws," by reducing the number of sites
at which recycling enforcement would be necessary. 340 The Court's interrogation of this argument was, at best, cursory, amounting to rational
basis review, and requiring the relationship between ends and means,
rather than the substantive tradeoff, to be reasonable. And this minimal
scrutiny assuredly reflected a careful and deliberate choice to eschew the
traditional burden analysis. Consider its disdainful description of burden
review:
[The haulers] maintain that the Counties' laws cannot survive the
more permissive Pike test, because of asserted burdens on commerce.
There is a common thread to these arguments: They are invitations to
rigorously scrutinize economic legislation passed under the auspices
of the police power. There was a time when this Court presumed to
make such binding judgments for society, under the guise of interpreting the Due Process Clause. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 . . . (1905). We should not seek to reclaim that ground for judicial
supremacy under the banner of the dormant Commerce Clause. 34 1

337.

Id, (citation omitted).

338.
United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 33437 (2007) (plurality opinion).
339.

See infra III.D.2 (discussing the public entity exception coined in United Haulers).

340.
341.

United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 346-47.
Id at 347 (citation omitted).
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If this brutal language inflicted a mortal wound on burden review,
the Court finished it off the next year in Davis. In that case (described
above 342), the Court declined to even go through the motions of applying
the test, on the ground that "the Judicial Branch is not institutionally
suited to draw reliable conclusions of the kind that would be necessary
for the Davises to satisfy a Pike burden in this particular case." 343 In par
ticular, the Court explained that "weighing and quantifying [the alleged
harms] for a cost-benefit analysis would be a very subtle exercise." 344
The Court went on to disclaim any meaningful institutional capacity "for
making whatever predictions and reaching whatever answers are possible
at all," and quoted from previous judgments emphasizing that the Court
is poorly placed to "gather the facts upon which economic predictions
can be made," "professionally untrained to make [economic predictions]," and "poorly equipped to evaluate with precision the relative burdens of various methods of taxation." 345
This line of argument should be deeply familiar. Just like the reasons given in CTS Corp., Tracy, and United Haulers, none of the reasons
given for "specially" weakening the scrutiny of the dormant Commerce
Clause are specific to the facts of Davis. They are fundamental attacks on
the propriety of burden review for reasonableness as such. Only Justice
Scalia, in his partial concurrence, squarely acknowledged that fact. 34 6
Such is the state of burden review today. Dan Coenen argues that
Davis might "pave the way" for the repudiation of burden review. 347 I
think that Davis and its companion UnitedHaulers are the repudiation of
burden review. I say this because what is truly significant is not just the
outcome in these cases, but the reasoning and the derisive tone in which
burden review is treated. Courts govern not just by what they do, but by
how they say that they are doing it. And the steady and sustained lowering of burden review into the rhetorical mire, culminating in the reference to Lochner v. New York 348 in United Haulers (not in an angry and
polemical dissent from a known opponent of the dormant Commerce
Clause but, rather, in an opinion of the Court written by the Chief Justice), and the flat-out refusal to apply it in Davis, are profoundly instructive. The most recent case to mention the doctrine of burden review342.

See supra text accompanying note 251 (discussing Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S.

328, 333-34 (2008)).
343. Davis, 553 U.S. at 354-56.
344. Id. at 354.
345. Id. at 355-56 (quoting Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 342 (1996)).
346.
Id. at 360 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
347.
Dan T. Coenen, Where United Haulers Might Take Us: The Future of the State-SelfPromotion Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause Rule, 95 IOWA L. REV. 541, 627 (2010); see
also Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Federalism in a Global Economy, 83 VA. L. REV. 1283, 1293
(1997) ("[T]he [Pike] balancing test in practice has become increasingly lax.... If [it] continues to
be applied in this fashion, U.S. law may be evolving toward a purely discrimination-based test in
domestic trade cases.").

348.

198 U.S. 45 (1905).

2017] THE DECLINE OF THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE

303

McBurney349 -refused to even acknowledge a burden at all, on the
ground that the case was somehow inappropriate for Commerce Clause
adjudication.350
D. A ProliferationofExceptions
The third aspect of the modem erosion of the dormant Commerce
Clause-marking a leap far beyond even what Donald Regan advocated
in 1986-is the proliferation of special exceptions to the reach of the
Clause. I will discuss four of them here: (1) the market participant exception; (2) the "public enterprise" or "public entity" exception; (3) the subsidy exception; and (4) the "traditional government function" exception.
1. Market Participant
The market participant doctrine was introduced in two casesHughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.35 ' in 1976 and Reeves, Inc. v. Stake352
in 1980-to reflect the proposition that the dormant Commerce Clause
does not limit a state's power to buy and sell goods and services.353 The
doctrine is often explained in terms of a dichotomous split between a
state's action "in its proprietary capacity as a purchaser or seller," 354 regarding which the dormant Commerce Clause has nothing to say, and its
action in a regulatory capacity, which falls within the ambit of the doctrine. This distinction can be justified clearly enough on textual
grounds: the existence of a partly exclusive federal power to regulate
commerce does not, at least intuitively, furnish grounds to preclude a

state from engaging in

it.3 5 5

But the complications start very early. Oddly, Alexandria Scrap itself was not at all a clear case of buying or selling: at issue in that case
was a statutory scheme that made bounty payments available to scrap
processors for each car hulk that they processed. 356 But a true "core case"
of market participation was presented by Reeves, which concerned the
discriminatory sales policy of a state-owned cement factory. The Court
held that the dormant Commerce Clause did not constrain such a poli-

349.

McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709, 1719-20 (2013).

350.
See supra text accompanying notes 257-68 (discussing the conclusion in McBurney); see
also discussion infra Section Ill.D.1 (discussing the application of the market participation doctrine
in McBurney).

351.
352.
353.
354.
(1997).

426 U.S. 794 (1976).
447 U.S. 429 (1980).
Id. at 435-39; Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 808-10.
E.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 592-93

355.

The Court has tended not to make this textual point, relying instead on originalist logic.

See, e.g., Reeves, 447 U.S. at 437 ("There is no indication of a constitutional plan to limit the ability
of the States themselves to operate freely in the free market." (citation omitted)); see also Alexandria
Scrap, 426 U.S. at 810 (focusing on "the purposes animating the Commerce Clause").

356.
357.

Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 798-800.
Reeves, 447 U.S. at 430-33.
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cy.358 Reeves followed a fortiori from Alexandria Scrap: if creating a
statutory subsidy-hardly classic "private" activity-was enough to constitute market participation, selling cement on the open market from a
factory certainly was enough.
Subsequent cases have generally affirmed the basic distinction between trading and regulating. For example, when Ohio argued in
Limbach that a tax exemption for in-state ethanol should be thought of as
a "purchase" of the ethanol and therefore market participation-a claim
that, in fairness, is not a million miles from the logic of Alexandria
Scrap-the Court knocked the argument back. 35 9 Likewise, the Court
rejected an attempt to repackage a tax exemption as "purchasing" in
360
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison.
A little oddly,
the doctrine immunizes competitive distortions only in the market in
which the state actor directly participates.
So much for the basic doctrine. Symptoms of "decline" are found
here not in the creation of the doctrine, which is unobjectionable enough
and perfectly compatible with the Traditional Framework, but in the subsequent expansion of the "market participant exception." The key cases
are already familiar to us: Davis and McBurney.
Davis is a peculiar and fragmented decision, but the three-Justice
plurality in that case sowed a remarkable seed in market participation
jurisprudence. Recall that Davis concerned a tax exemption granted by
Kentucky for income from its own bonds, denied to income from the
bonds of other states.362 The state rather speculatively raised a market
participation defense, even though tax rules-as "primeval government
activity"-had been repeatedly contrasted with market participation in
countless earlier decisions. That a state should throw in a cheeky argu358.
359.
360.
361.

Id. at 440-41.
New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 277-78 (1988).
520 U.S. 564, 593-94 (1997).
See S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 97 (1984). Wunnicke is not only

odd on its face (because it has nothing to do with the regulation/participation distinction underlying
the doctrine), but is also decidedly in tension with a case that was decided only the previous year. In
White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc., the mayor of Boston issued an
executive order requiring that city construction projects be carried out by a workforce of which at

least 50% was composed of residents of Boston. 460 U.S. 204, 205-06 (1983). The Court concluded
in that case that "[i]nsofar as the city expended only its own funds in entering into construction
contracts for public projects, it was a market participant and entitled to be treated as such . . . ." Id. at
214-15. But the city was not hiring laborers, it was hiring construction firms that hired laborers. Id.
at 217. So Wunnicke's same-market limitation seems flatly at odds with White, and simply overrules
it on that point. A "same market" rule of this kind is, of course, a strange and formalistic limitation: buying and selling invariably has competitive consequences in upstream and downstream
markets, and if the market participant doctrine rests on the fact that the conduct does not involve the
exercise of the State's distinctive regulatory powers with which the Commerce Clause is concerned,
and given the usual indifference of Commerce Clause doctrine to any disparity between the point in

the supply chain at which a measure is formally applied and the point at which it has allegedly
anticompetitive effects, the Wunnicke conclusion is hard to justify. But see Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at
98-99 (attempting-rather unconvincingly-to justify the rule).

362.

Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 333 (2008) (plurality opinion).
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ment in a kitchen-sink effort to defend a facially discriminatory tax exemption is not surprising. But what is surprising is that three Justices of
the Supreme Court accepted it:
[T]here is no ignoring the fact that imposing the differential tax
scheme makes sense only because Kentucky is also a bond issuer.
The Commonwealth has entered the market for debt securities, just as
Maryland entered the market for automobile hulks, and South Dakota
entered the cement market. It simply blinks this reality to disaggregate the Commonwealth's two roles and pretend that in exempting
the income from its securities, Kentucky is independently regulating
or regulating in the garden variety way that has made a State vulnerable to the dormant Commerce Clause... . [W]hen Kentucky exempts its bond interest, it is competing in the market for limited investment dollars, alongsideprivate bond issuers and its sister States,
and its tax structure is one of the tools of competition.363
For the plurality, as a result, the market participant doctrine should
have applied in Davis.3 '4 In vain did Justice Kennedy cry out in dissent
that "[t]his expansion of the market-participant exception, if it were unleashed by a majority of the Court, would be an open invitation to enact
these kinds of discriminatory laws-laws that, until today, the Court has
not upheld in even a single instance," and that the Court had repeatedly
held that "[t]axation is a quintessential act of regulation, not market participation." 365 Justice Kennedy was quite right: the plurality was flatly at
odds with strong language in Camps Newfound/Owatonna,366
368
Limbach,367 and C & A Carbone.
The crack in the market participation doctrine was to be opened further in McBurney a few years later. In McBurney itself, recall that the
Court considered a case of discriminatory regulation-access to Virginia
public records under the state FOIA law-and failed to analyze it as
such. 369 But what is interesting for our purposes now is what the Court
went on to say. The Court stated that even if dormant Commerce Clause
analysis were applied, it would fail because the public documents in
question were created by Virginia. That fact was significant because "a

363.

Id. at 344-45 (emphasis added) (footnote and citations omitted).

364.
365.
366.

Id. at 348.
Id at 375 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 593 (1997) ("A tax

exemption is not the sort of direct state involvement in the market that falls within the marketparticipation doctrine.").

367.

New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 277-78 (1988) (emphasizing that the

"assessment and computation of taxes" was "a primeval governmental activity," not market participation).

368.

C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 394 (1994) ("[H]aving elected

to use the open market to earn revenues for its project, the town may not employ discriminatory
regulation to give that project an advantage over rival businesses from out of State.").
369.
See supra text accompanying notes 256-69 (discussing analysis of discrimination in

McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709 (2013)).
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State does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause when, having created a market through a state program, it 'limits benefits generated by
[that] state program to those who fund the state treasury and whom the
State was created to serve,"' citing to-of all things-Reeves, the cement-factory case. 370

This aspect of McBurney is on any view a pretty shocking misapplication of the market participation doctrine: Virginia was not buying nor
selling anything. The statutory provision of a right of access to public
records falls about as far from market participation as one could imagine.
The "created by the State" doctrine in McBurney-a kind of mutated
super-version of the market participant exception-is troubling in principle and as applied. In principle, it threatens to apply broadly: to anything
that the state alone does or provides. Infrastructure, regulatory approvals,
corporate charters, licenses to trade or carry on a profession, police and
fire protection, and all the rest of it: these are things "which would not
otherwise exist" without state action. But the doctrine is even worse as
applied in McBurney itself, for it completely misses the point that the
market in which the Court was distorting competition-the market for
real estate information providers, perhaps-was by no means a market
that had been created by the state.371 Rather, the company was competing
in an existing market against existing in-state companies, and in that
market it was subject to facial discrimination that created a competitive
disadvantage. To all this the Court averted its eyes.
The market participant doctrine thus stands extended in two directions. The plurality opinion in Davis lies about like the proverbial "loaded weapon,"372 ready to be picked up by a later majority and used as support for the notion that "market participation" includes any exercise of
the state's regulatory powers in connection with something in which the
state has an economic or quasi-competitive interest. And, more troublingly still, the "created by the State" version offered by a majority of
the Court in McBurney threatens application of the doctrine to a great
swathe of state conduct. This exemption seems ready to burst its banks
entirely.

370.
371.

McBurney, 133 S. Ct. at 1720 (quoting Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 442 (1980)).
Compare Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 809 n.18 (1976) ("[T]he

commerce affected by the 1974 amendment appears to have been created, in whole or in substantial
part, by the Maryland bounty scheme. We would hesitate to hold that the Commerce Clause forbids
state action reducing or eliminating a flow of commerce dependent for its existence upon state subsidy instead of private market forces. Because the record contains no details of the hulk market prior
to the bounty scheme, however, this issue is not clearly presented."), with id. at 815 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). See also Reeves, 447 U.S. at 446 n.18 (suggesting that the Alexandria Scrap Court
could hardly have meant that the scrap processing market was created by the State).

372.

See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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2. Public Enterprise / Public Entity
The Roberts Court has also created an entirely new exception,
which was inaugurated in United Haulers, and confirmed and expanded
in Davis. Under this exception, immunity attaches to: (1) a state's creation of state-owned enterprises that operate in the market; and also (2) to
the conferral, through regulation, of competitive advantages-up to and
including full regulatory monopoly-on such enterprises. I will call this
a "public enterprise" or "public entity" exception. 373
In United Haulers, the Court effectively held that the decision by a
state, or a subdivision thereof, to "nationalize" an area of industrial activity, including by precluding or limiting private competition or by discriminating in favor of a public enterprise, is beyond the purview of the
Clause: "The dormant Commerce Clause is not a roving license for federal courts to decide what activities are appropriate for state and local
government to undertake, and what activities must be the province of
private market competition." 374 Thus, laws that "benefit a clearly public
facility, while treating all private companies exactly the same.. . . do not
discriminate against interstate commerce for purposes of the dormant
Commerce Clause."
Notwithstanding the protestations of the United Haulersmajority,376
this holding is a clear retreat from the earlier decision in C & A Carbone,
a case in which the Court held unlawful an attempt to discriminate in
favor of what was at the very least a public-private partnership (more
accurately a public entity under short-term private administration for
funding purposes).377 In C & A Carbone itself, the Court stated that "having elected to use the open market to earn revenues for its project [(a
waste processing facility)], the town may not employ discriminatory regulation to give that project an advantage over rival businesses from out of
State." 378 In other words, the thrust of the holding in C & A Carbone was
that a state, having decided to create a competitor, may not tip the table
in favor of its own creation by exercising regulatory powers-the traditional province of the dormant Commerce Clause, unlike the essentially
private conduct that the market participation exemption indulges 379-in a
discriminatory fashion. Earlier cases supported this outcome.380
373.
Others have their own labels. See, e.g., Coenen, supra note 347, at 544 ("state-selfpromotion" exception); Williams, supra note 2, at 455 ("sovereign protectionism").

374.

United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 343

(2007) (plurality opinion); see also id at 344 ("It is not the office of the Commerce Clause to control
the decision of the voters on whether government or the private sector should provide waste management services.").

375.

Id. at 342 (emphasis added).

376.

Id. at 341 ("Carbonecannot be regarded as having decided the public-private question.").

377.
378.

See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 387, 393-94 (1994).
Id at 394.

379.

See supra Section III.D. I (discussing the logic of the market participant exception).

380.

See UnitedHaulers,550 U.S. at 361-63 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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But United Haulers (unconvincingly) distinguished C & A Carbone
and reversed the rule for which it stood."' It is true that the Court held in
United Haulers that such rules were still subject to Pike burden review,
but it is hard to credit this as more than a token gesture, given the thorough beating that burden review has now taken, 382 and given the withering disdain for burden review shown in UnitedHaulers itself.383 And the
United Haulers approach was affirmed recently by Davis, the Kentucky
in which the state tax rule clearly "operated as a de
bond-income case,
facto protective tariff." 3 85 But "[t]here is no forbidden discrimination,"
the Court concluded in Davis-not, on this point, a plurality, but a majority of the Court-"because Kentucky, as a public entity, does not have
to treat itself as being substantially similar to the other bond issuers in
the market."

386

So the rule is now clear: the state can use its regulatory and taxing
powers to favor the competitive position of a public enterprise or other
387
public entity without fear of the dormant Commerce Clause.
What is
still prohibited by the doctrine, at least in principle, is conferral of a direct regulatory competitive advantage on private in-state actors.388 Needless to say, this suggests an inability to "appreciate the extent to which
government and private operations are and can be comingled," 389 or that
"there is just as much reason to believe that state or local governments
are likely to act upon protectionist considerations when the benefited
operation is owned by the government as when the benefited operation is
privately held." 390

Moreover, read together, the public entity and market participant
exceptions open the door to considerable discrimination in favor of private entities. For example, it is elementary that Arizona could not enact a
statute (say, the Arizona Plumbing Preference Act) that provided that
"only Arizona companies may supply plumbing services in Arizona": that would constitute intentional, facial discrimination, and the
dormant Commerce Clause prohibits that if it prohibits anything. But
there would seem to be nothing to stop Arizona from creating the Arizona State Plumbing Corporation (immune under United Haulers's public

381.

Id. at 342 (majority opinion).

382.
383.

See supra Section III.C.2 (discussing the retreat from burden review).
See supra text accompanying note 341.

384.

Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 332-34 (2008) (plurality opinion).

385.
Coenen, supra note 347, at 561; see also Williams, supra note 2, at 466 ("Kentucky's tax
on the interest on out-of-state municipal bonds [was] nothing more than a tariff .... ).
386.
Davis, 553 U.S. at 343 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).

387.
U.S. 330,
388.
U.S. 383,

Id. at 341-43; United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550
342-43 (2007) (plurality opinion).
United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 343-44; C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511
394 (1994).

389.

Norman R. Williams & Brannon P. Denning, The "New Protectionism"and the American

Common Market, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 247, 282 (2009).
390.

Williams, supra note 2, at 459.
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entity exception), legislating to prohibit other private businesses from
engaging in plumbing in Arizona (also immune under United Haulers's
public entity exception), and then having the Arizona State Plumbing
Corp. grant franchises only to Arizona businesses (immune under the
market participant exception 39 1). Compare it with the Arizona Plumbing
Preference Act. The same outcome has been reached-all Arizona businesses are free to compete, and no out-of-state ones are-but the means
are perfectly lawful.392
Accordingly, I do not share Chief Justice Roberts's view that there
is a meaningful line to be drawn between the outcome in United Haulers
and the creation of a state-owned hamburger stand combined with an
ordinance requiring that all residents buy their hamburgers from the
stand.393 If there is a real difference between this and United Haulers, I
simply do not see it, and the Chief Justice does not tell us what it is. I
make no claim here about the desirability of this outcome, but if burden
review-last seen alive not much more recently than Jimmy Hoffa and
Lord Lucan-is the best hope for striking down a measure as obviously
discriminatory and protectionist as my Arizona plumbing example, we
can say at the very least that the dormant Commerce Clause is not quite
what it used to be. Norman Williams and Brannon Denning describe this
outcome as "public protectionism, "394 to which I would add that the protectionism that it so obviously validates need not in practice be public, as
my Arizona example shows.
In sum, state-owned enterprises now enjoy a remarkable quadruple
exemption from the fundamental rules of American economic organization. The public entity doctrine exempts such enterprises from dormant
Commerce Clause scrutiny with respect to their creation; the market participant exemption immunizes their trading conduct in the market; the
public entity doctrine (again) immunizes any state regulation that skews
the terms of competition in their favor; and the state action doctrine exempts them from antitrust control. Noli me tangere, says the state-owned
enterprise, for Caesar's I am.

391.

White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Emp'rs, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 214-15 (1983) (applying

market participation to awards of contracts to provide public works). Note that the Wunnicke samemarket exception would not apply because our notional ASPC would be active in the same market as
its franchisees. See supra note 361 (discussing the Wunnicke limitation and its interaction with
White).
392.
Dan Coenen argues that a scheme of this kind would be unlawful because it fails to respect United Haulers's mandate to "treat[] all private businesses the same." Coenen, supra note 347,
611 (internal quotation marks omitted). But the same is true of all market participant cases, including
Alexandria Scrap and Reeves: the unequal treatment is the very thing that the market participant
exemption immunizes.

393.
394.

United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 345 n.7.
Williams & Denning, supra note 389, at 310.
/

395.
Wyatt's full couplet makes the point unimprovably: "Noli me tangere for Cesars I ame,
And wylde for to hold though I seme tame." Thomas Wyatt, Whoso List to Hounte, in THE OXFORD

BooK OF ENGLISH VERSE 28 (Christopher Ricks ed., 1999).
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3. Subsidies

If there were ever a single example of the Court's unwillingness to
let economic theory dictate doctrine, it is the proposition-heavily indicated by the Court's jurisprudence but never quite held outright 39 6-that
the provision of subsidies is immune from dormant Commerce Clause
scrutiny. Thus, to tax in-state A one dollar and out-of-state B two dollars
is an unlawful discriminatory tax; to tax them both two dollars and give
A a one dollar rebate or tax exemption is an unlawful discriminatory tax
exemption; but to tax them equally and give A a one dollar subsidy from
the state's general treasury is a completely lawful subsidy. Make of that
what you will. 397

I will state the doctrinal case for the legality of subsidies very briefly, as it is essentially a mosaic of dicta. Like the other elements of the
"decline" that we have charted here, the notion becomes prominent in the
Court's case law from the mid-1980s onward.
* In Limbach (1988), the Court stated that "[d]irect subsidization of
domestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul of [the dormant Commerce Clause]." 3 8

"

* In C & A Carbone (1994), the Court actively invited subsidization: "Clarkstown maintains that special financing is necessary to ensure
the long-term survival of the designated facility. If so, the town may subsidize the facility through general taxes or municipal bonds."
* In West Lynn Creamery (1994), the Court held that "[a] pure subsidy funded out of general revenue ordinarily imposes no burden on interstate commerce, but merely assists local business."4 00
* In Camps Newfound/Owatonna (1997), the Court held: "Although
tax exemptions and subsidies serve similar ends, they differ in important
and relevant respects, and our cases have recognized these distinctions." 401 The Court acknowledged that "[w]e have never squarely confronted the constitutionality of subsidies, and we need not address these
questions today," 402 but noted that the distinction between tax exemptions and subsidies "is supported by scholarly commentary as well as
precedent, and we see no reason to depart from it."403 And it went
on: "[a]ssuming, arguendo, that the Town is correct that a direct subsidy
396.

See, e.g., Coenen, supra note 2, at 968-69 (noting that the Court "still has not ruled" on

the legality of subsidies).
397.
Cf Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 273 (1984) ("The determination of constitutionality does not depend upon whether one focuses upon the benefited or the burdened party.").

398.
399.
400.
401.

New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988).
C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 394 (1994).
W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 (1994).
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 589 (1997).

402.
403.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
Id. at 591 (citations omitted).
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benefiting only those nonprofits serving principally Maine residents
would be permissible, our cases do not sanction a tax exemption serving
similar ends." 40
Similar support is found in a series of concurring and dissenting
opinions.40 5 To date, the case most thoroughly testing the limits of the
Court's position on subsidies remains West Lynn Creamery, a case involving a challenge to a subsidy paid to in-state upstream dairy farmers
which was funded directly by a non-discriminatory tax on all downstream milk dealers.406 Holding the measure unlawful, the Court drew a
distinction between a so-called "pure" subsidy funded out of general
revenue, which "ordinarily imposes no burden on interstate commerce,
but merely assists local business,"4 07 and one funded directly from a tax
levied specifically upon the same industry. The closest the Court came to
explaining the significance of this distinction for dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine involved the suspicious notion of "representation reinforcement." 408
West Lynn Creamery is odd because, as Brannon Denning accurately points out, the tax in that case did not discriminate between in-state
and out-of-state competitors. 409 But I think it is best understood as a case
in which the discriminatory subsidy for in-state dairy farmers was the
troubling element, to which the Court was unwilling to accord the usual
subsidy exemption given its entanglement with a taxing measure.
In any event, the Court has since doubled down on its doctrinal distinction between a tax exemption and a subsidy. When Maine gave favorable tax treatment to businesses serving in-state customers in Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, it argued that it was simply subsidizing the provision of services to in-staters. Not so, the Court replied: "[a]lthough tax
exemptions and subsidies serve similar ends, they differ in important and
relevant respects, and our cases have recognized these distinctions."4 10
Maine's protest that "in economic reality," given their economic equivalence, "since a discriminatory subsidy may be permissible, a discriminatory exemption must be, too," was unavailing. 411 The Court noted that it
had treated tax exemptions and subsidies differently under the First
404.
Id. at 589 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 589 n.22 (describing this more candidly as
"[t]he distinction we have drawn for dormant Commerce Clause purposes").

405. See id. at 597 (Scalia, J., dissenting); W. Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 213 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting); id. at 211 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 351
(1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Metro. Life Ins. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 895 (1985) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 816 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
406.
W Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 188.
407.
Id at 199.
408.
Id at 200-01; see also supra text accompanying note 30 (discussing representation reinforcement).
409.
Denning, supra note 2, at 468.
410.
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 589.

411.

Id.
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Amendment,4 12 as well as in its previous Commerce Clause cases, and
declined to reconsider the distinction. 4 13
I do not propose to say much more about this exception. The peculiar distinction between discriminatory subsidies and discriminatory burdens has some defenders,4 14 but many critics.

415

4. Traditional Government Function
The final topic that we will consider here falls just short of being a
clear-cut exemption. It is more like an animating concern: in the area of
"traditional governmental functions," the Court betrays particular reluctance to deploy the dormant Commerce Clause.
a. Background: The Short Life of Usery
As a general matter, the notion that states enjoy a special zone of
constitutional protection in areas of "traditional" governmental functions
had its time in the sun during the nine-year life of National League of
Cities v. Usery.416 The story is very well known but will bear a quick
retelling. It presented the question of Congress's power under the affirmative Commerce Clause to apply a statute regulating minimum wages,
overtime pay, and the like to state government employees.4 17 The federal
law was challenged as an invasion of core areas of state sovereignty that
were constitutionally protected from Congressional legislation.4 18
The Supreme Court sided with the states. Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the Court, held that the Constitution-including but not limited to the
Tenth Amendmen 4 19-extended
a shield of constitutional protection
over at least some quantum of state sovereignty. 420 The Court held that
"insofar as the challenged amendments operate to directly displace the
States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions," they fell outside the scope of the Commerce

412.
413.

Id. at 590 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970)).
Id. at 589-91.

414.
See, e.g., Coenen, supra note 2, at 983; Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 102 (1988); Clayton P. Gillette, Business Incentives, Interstate
Competition, and the Commerce Clause, 82 M[NN. L. REV. 447, 495 (1997); Lawrence, supra note

56, at 454.
415.
See, e.g., Heinzerling, supra note 2, at 263; Edward A. Zelinsky, Restoring Politics to the
Commerce Clause: The Case for Abandoning the Dormant Commerce Clause Prohibitionon Discriminatory Taxation, 29 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 29, 34-35 (2002); see also Coenen, supra note 2, at
969, 1031-54 (proposing the invalidation of subsidies that "share[] the essential constitutional defects of a discriminatory tax break").

416.
426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528 (1985), superseded by statute, Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-150,
99 Stat. 787, 787 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2012)).
417. Id at 836.
418. Id at 837.
419.
Id at 842-43.
420. Id at 845.
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Clause and were void.421 Four members of the Court dissented, with Justice Brennan, in particular, criticizing the majority opinion as "a catastrophic judicial body blow at Congress' power under the Commerce
Clause."422
The Usery holding survived for just under ten years, during which
time federal and state courts struggled with the attempt to determine
what was, and what was not, a "traditional governmental function."4 23
But in 1985, in Garciav. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,42 4
the Supreme Court finally gave up the fight. Garcia turned on whether
San Antonio's mass transit system was engaged in a "traditional governmental function." 425 The Court conceded that even "this Court itself
has made little headway in defining the scope of the governmental functions deemed protected under [Usery]."426 Neither part of the "traditional
governmental" diptych had turned out to be very robust: on the "traditional" side, the Court rejected the notion that actual historical tradition
could be the Court's guide to the immunity of state conduct from federal
interference. 427 On the "governmental" side, there was barely any such
thing as a uniquely or necessarily governmental function.42 So Usery
was overruled as "unsound in principle and unworkable in practice.A 29
In its place was set a straightforward admission that "with rare exceptions ... the Constitution does not carve out express elements of state
sovereignty that Congress may not employ its delegated powers to displace."4 30 It was the political process, framed by the Constitution, that
would henceforth protect that sovereignty. 3 1
b. Traditional Government Functions and the Dormant Commerce Clause
Back to the dormant Commerce Clause. As a matter of principle,
does a "traditional government function" exemption, or zone of special
421.
422.
423.

Id. at 852.
Id. at 880 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Compare Molina-Estrada v. P.R. Highway Auth., 680 F.2d 841, 845 (1st Cir. 1982) (find-

ing operating a highway authority to be a traditional government function), and United States v.

Best, 573 F.2d 1095, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding licensing automobile drivers to be a traditional government function), with Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25, 38 (2d Cir. 1977) (finding
regulation of traffic on public roads not to be a traditional government function).
424.
469 U.S. 528 (1985), superseded by statute, Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985,

Pub. L. No. 99-150,

§ 2, 99 Stat. 787,

787 (codified at 29 U.S.C.

425.

Id. at 534 (internal quotation marks omitted).

426.
427.
428.
429.
430.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

§ 207 (2012)).

539.
543-44.
545.
546.
550.

431.
Id. at 550-55. Of course, since Garciathe Court has demonstrated a willingness to intervene on other "federalism" grounds. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism,

70 S. CAL. L. REv. 1311, 1335 (1997) ("Whether the Court will explicitly overrule Garcia is almost
a moot question, because the Court already has decided to ignore its requirements and to exert full
judicial review over questions involving state sovereignty and federalism.").
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deference, make any more sense under the dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause than on the affirmative side considered in Usery and Garcia?
One might see at least four reasons to say no. First, the Usery experience strongly suggests that there is no way to make such a category
workable. No one knows what "traditional governmental activity"
means, or what it should mean. Second, recall the logic of the market
participant exemption. The premise of that exception is that the dormant
Commerce Clause is with distinctively governmental action (regulation),
not distinctively private action (trading). The point is obvious: it is bizarre to suggest that the doctrine is really concerned with distinctively
governmental action but also should be particularly deferential to traditional governmental action. Third, there is a basic problem of constitutional interpretation here. "Traditional governmental actions" includes, at
the very least, whatever state governments were getting up to in the late
eighteenth century when the Commerce Clause was being drafted. So the
very types of activity that the dormant Commerce Clause must have been
intended to preclude-assuming that it was intended to target and preclude some types of state action-are precisely the same types of activity
that a "traditional governmental function" exemption would tend to protect. Fourth, as a matter of precedent, the Court has repeatedly denied
that there is any special constitutional preference for laws enacted in the
exercise of "police power." The modern state police power is simply
what is left over after the federal Constitution and any validly enacted
federal laws have been applied, not a source of special immunity from
federal law or federal action.432 So the case for special deference for
"traditional" governmental actions-above and beyond the deference
normally applicable to democratically enacted legislation-is very weak
indeed.
And yet the reemergence of the traditional governmental function
exception in dormant Commerce Clause case law is clear. We have already seen that seeds of "special" deference were sown in CTS Corp.
(particular deference to state regulation of corporationS 433) and in Tracy

432. See, e.g., Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 380-81 (1946); S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel.
Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 779-81 (1945); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935);
Kan. City S. Ry. Co. v. Kaw Valley Drainage Dist., 233 U.S. 75, 79 (1914); Barrett v. City of New
York, 232 U.S. 14, 31 (1914); Crenshaw v. Arkansas, 227 U.S. 389, 399 (1913); Savage v. Jones,
225 U.S. 501, 524-25 (1912); Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 151 (1902); Crutcher v. Kentucky,
141 U.S. 47, 61-62 (1891); Bowman v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 490-92 (1888); Walling
v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 446, 460 (1886); Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 271-72
(1875); see also FRANKFURTER, supra note 147, at 47 (describing the proposition that "the existence
of the states operated as an impalpable limitation upon national powers" as the "most insidious
application" of "the general principle of strict construction").
433.
See supra text accompanying notes 332-42 (discussing CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of

Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987)).
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(particular deference to state regulations of gas supply434). We have seen
that the theme came back strongly in United Haulers, in which the Court
deployed the notion as a ground for "hesitation," explaining that special
deference was appropriate because "waste disposal"-waste disposal!was "both typically and traditionally a local government function."A35
Justice Alito, in dissent, protested that "this Court has previously recognized that any standard 'that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a
particular governmental function is "integral" or "traditional"' is 'unsound in principle and unworkable in practice."' 36 And we find that this
aspect of United Haulers was reloaded with a vengeance in Davis, with
the language moving to "quintessentially public," and its function moving from supportive dicta in United Haulers to the central basis for the
holding in Davis:
It follows afortiori from United Haulers that Kentucky must prevail
[in Davis]. In United Haulers, we explained that a government function is not susceptible to standard dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny owing to its likely motivation by legitimate objectives distinct
from the simple economic protectionism the Clause abhors. [The]
logic [of immunizing measures that are "likely motivated by legitimate objectives"] applies with even greater force to laws favoring a
State's municipal bonds, given that the issuance of debt securities to
pay for public projects is a quintessentiallypublicfunction, with the
venerable history we have already sketched.... [T]he apprehension
in United Haulers about "unprecedented . .. interference" with a traditional government function is just as warranted here ... .437
It was left to Justice Kennedy to point out the concept that was really doing the work:
The Court defends the Kentucky law by explaining that it serves a
traditional government function and concerns the "cardinal civic responsibilities" of protecting health, safety, and welfare. This is but a
reformulation of the phrase "police power," long abandoned as a
mere tautology. It is difficult to identify any state law that has come
before us that would not meet the Court's description. 438
Quite so.
Note the full circle here formed by the interaction of "traditional
governmental function" with the other market participant and public entity exceptions. Any activity that is not totally novel since the Founding
434.

See supra text accompanying notes 229-39 (discussing Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519

U.S. 278 (1997)).
435. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 34445 (2007) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
436. Id. at 368-69 (Alito, J., dissenting).
437.
Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 341-42 (2008) (plurality opinion) (emphasis
added) (footnotes and citations omitted).

438.

Id. at 365-66 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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was "traditionally" performed by someone: it was either traditionally
private or traditionally public. If it was traditionally private but now performed by the state, it is likely to be covered by the market participation
or public entity defenses. If it was traditionally public, it is likely to be a
traditional governmental activity. Heads I win, tails you lose. We behold
clearly, at last, the remarkable decline of the dormant Commerce Clause.
IV. CONCLUSION

My primary purpose in this contribution has been to expose, not to
criticize, the doctrinal transformation wrought by the Court. Rather than
recapitulate the preceding pages, I want to conclude by drawing out four
central attacks that have been leveled repeatedly, from the bench and
from the academy, at the Traditional Framework, and which I think have
influenced and motivated the decline that I have chronicled above. I reserve for another occasion the task of developing and answering these
four challenges to the Traditional Framework.4 39
The first is the elephant that awkwardly shares the room with a
great deal of dormant Commerce Clause discussion: deep unease about
the legitimacy of the doctrine's claim to the status of constitutional law,
given the absence of clear grounding in the text or early history of the
Constitution. From the bench, Justice Scalia has called the doctrine "a
judicial fraud,"""' and Justice Thomas claims it has "no basis in the Constitution.""' From the academy, Redish and Nugent have called it "little
more than a figment of the Supreme Court's imagination,"442 and Kitch
has called it "an idea of absolutely no merit."M3

"

The second is the claim that burden review is analytically formless: a cipher for a naked policy choice. This is exemplified by Justice
Scalia's quip that burden review of state regulation is like asking
"whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy." 4
Brannon Denning makes a related point, noting that burden review re-

439.
See Francis, supra note 3, to which this Conclusion is heavily indebted and from which it
borrows extensively.
440.
Comptroller of Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1808 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("The negative Commerce Clause applied today has little in common with the negative Commerce
Clause of the 19th century, except perhaps for incoherence."); see also Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of
Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 674-75 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[A]s I have explained elsewhere, the negative Commerce Clause, having no foundation in the text of the Constitution and not
lending itself to judicial application except in the invalidation of facially discriminatory action,
should not be extended beyond such action and nondiscriminatory action of the precise sort hitherto
invalidated."); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 312 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[T]he
so-called 'negative' Commerce Clause is an unjustified judicial intervention not to be expanded
beyond its existing domain.").
441.
United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 349 (Thomas, J., concurring).
442.
Redish & Nugent, supranote 2, at 617.
443.
Kitch, supra note 2, at 123.
444.
Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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quires weighing "things that are not readily reducible to a common metric."
The third is the claim that burden review, as a species of "judicial
balancing," is inherently illegitimate and undemocratic, that it is a remnant of discredited Lochner-ism that deserves to be forcibly retired.46
Writing in this tradition, Lisa Heinzerling argues that
The Court's concept of discrimination embodies a preference for
markets over regulation, and its view of what counts as "regulation"
rests on undefended assumptions--reminiscent of the Lochner period,
when forced departures from the free market as shaped by commonlaw entitlements were constitutionally suspect but the common-law
entitlements were not--about what counts as government action and
what counts as inaction.447
From this perspective, burden review presents a particularly unpalatable form of the proverbial counter-majoritarian difficulty.448
The fourth is the claim that courts should concern themselves, wholly or in part, with the subjective intention or purpose of state regulators
rather than economic effects. The high priest of this tradition is Donald
Regan, who argued (as we have noted above) that "the court should
strike down a state law if and only if it finds by a preponderance of the
evidence that protectionist purpose on the part of the legislators contributed substantially to the adoption of the law or any feature of the law.""49
But the church of subjectivism is a broad one with many members. Norman Williams, for example, has proposed that legality under the dormant
commerce clause should turn on "deliberative equality,"45 0 by which he
means that state regulation of interstate commerce should be valid only if
the state government in question "gives equal regard to similarly situated

445.
Denning, supra note 2, at 494.
446.
See, e.g., id at 459 ("At its worst, [antidiscrimination law] is a tool for the promotion of
an economic ideology that smacks of Lochnerian economic substantive due process."); Richard C.
Schragger, Cities, Economic Development, and the Free Trade Constitution, 94 VA. L. REV. 1091,
1111 (2008) ("The right to pursue a common calling on equal terms as others was an aspect of
personal liberty that the Lochner-era courts revived as substantive due process, but which continues
as a function of the dormant commerce clause."); Williams, supra note 2, at 431 ("To suggest that
the Constitution protects economic efficiency--much less that the courts should enforce such protection--seems at first glance to urge a reprisal of the Lochner era, when the federal courts aggressively
policed state regulations in the name of a laissez faire capitalist ideology.").
447.
Heinzerling, supra note 2, at 222; see also id. at 268-69 ("Rather than promoting economic efficiency, representation reinforcement, and national unity, the Court's concepts of discrimination
and regulation suggest a return to Lochner-style assumptions about the natural and proper role of
government. Thus, the nondiscrimination principle is doomed not only by its failure to achieve its
stated objectives, but by its promotion of an unstated, outdated view about government's appropriate
boundaries.").
448.
See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (Yale Univ. Press, 2d ed. 1986).
449.
Regan, supranote 2, at 1148.

450.

Williams, supra note 2, at 414-16.

DENVER LAWREVIEW

318

[Vol. 94:2

in-state and out-of-state interests.'"45 Other notable subjectivists, or those

)

with subjectivist inclinations, include Mark Tushnet (who has described
the invalidation of measures motivated by an impermissible purpose as
"the most easily justifiable form of dormant commerce clause review" 452
and Catherine O'Grady, who writes that "judicial motive review is particularly appropriate and unobjectionable in a dormant Commerce Clause
analysis.'A53

Under this four-fold barrage of criticism, the dormant Commerce
Clause has fallen an awfully long way since the 1970s. Today, the Traditional Framework receives only formal dues-and, increasingly, not even
that-from the Court. But, in closing, I want to point out that the very
fact that the Court continues to make rhetorical genuflections to the traditional model (as do the lower courts) is, itself, of great significance. It
preserves the possibility that renewed life could be breathed into the doctrine, even into the Traditional Framework itself, before the profound
decline charted above becomes irreversible. Much will depend upon the
changing membership of the Court. The arrival of Justice Scalia in 1986,
as an outspoken and tireless critic of the doctrine, marked the beginning
in earnest of what I have described here as the decline of the dormant
Commerce Clause. His passing, and the arrival of his successor, may turn
out to mark a point of inflection in the story of this most protean of the
creatures of the Constitution. Time will tell.
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